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This dissertation is composed of three papers concerned with how firms respond to
uncertainty and dynamic interactions. These are areas that have long been important
research topics among industrial economists. The justification for this is obvious: the
course of events is rarely deterministic, and the past often exerts a marked influence on
present decisions. Both factors lead actors to adopt very different strategies from what
they would do in a deterministic, one-shot world. Below, I provide a short summary
of each paper, describing how I extend and contribute to this rich literature.
In my first paper, I consider how uncertainty stemming from unstable regulatory
regimes affects the boundaries of the firm. I present a simple theoretical model based
on the idea that more unstable regulatory regimes increase the expected costs of
both equity investment and trusting valuable intangible assets to outsiders. I test
the predictions of the model using data on the organizational form decisions of a
major international hotel firm. These data are ideal, because hotel properties can be
operated in three different ways:
• a highly centralized form in which the central firm takes a large equity stake
and retains operational control;
• an arms length arrangement in which the central firm relinquishes operational
control to an outsider who takes all of the equity risk; and
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• a hybrid form in which the central firm reduces its equity exposure but maintains
operational control.
Multinomial logit estimates strongly support the prediction of the theoretical model
that as regulatory stability decreases greater use is made of the hybrid form. Overall,
the paper extends recent work on the implications of institutional quality, showing
that they affect decision-making for retail businesses in addition to the high-tech and
manufacturing industries that have been the focus of much of the past literature.
My second paper continues to focus on issues relating to an uncertain regula-
tory environment, but it also incorporates strategic uncertainty. In other words, I
consider markets where firms must factor in the behavior of their competitors when
making decisions. Using a model of dynamic competition between capacity con-
strained oligopolists, I consider how the presence of exogenous uncertainty about the
arrival time of a more stringent regulatory regime affects the intensity of competition
relative to a world where the regulatory trajectory is fully deterministic. I find that
exogenous uncertainty about the regulatory future sometimes leads to the reverse
of the standard “real options” prediction of lower investment in uncertain environ-
ments. In other words, sometimes uncertainty leads to more investment. The lack of
a clear comparative static for uncertainty in part can be attributed to the nature of
the uncertainty, but it also reflects an interaction with the firms’ strategic incentives.
Moreover, my model shows that the differences in investment spending translate to
significant differences in total welfare. I believe my theoretical results have interesting
implications both for the design of regulatory policy and expectations about firm and
consumer behavior in a variety of contexts.
In my third paper, I reconcile ambiguities in the previous empirical work on spatial
preemption with the strong predictions offered by theory. I develop a game-theoretic
model that shows that incorporating the stylized facts of consumer heterogeneity and
brand awareness can help explain the heterogeneity of the past empirical evidence.
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The model shows that as products’ brand affiliations increase in importance to con-
sumers, preemption becomes less credible. I empirically test the implications of the
model using data on the lodging industry, which is the type of industry where one
might expect preemption, but one that is also characterized by high brand-values.
Consistent with my model, I find that incumbent lodging companies do not deter en-




The Effect of Regulatory Stability on
Organizational Form Decisions: Evidence from
Within the Firm1
2.1 Introduction
The effect of institutions on economy-wide growth and performance has long at-
tracted attention from economists (c.f. North and Thomas (1976), Acemoglu et al.
(2001), Dixit (2009)). More recently, a small but growing literature has considered
the effect of institutions at a more micro level, often by examining how multinational
corporations adapt to different local market conditions. This literature has explored,
among other things, how political and regulatory institutions affect the level of for-
eign investment (c.f. Levy and Spiller (1994), Henisz and Zelner (2001), Smarzynska
and Wei (2002)) as well as the different forms of investments (c.f. Oxley (1999),
Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), Uhlenbruck et al. (2006)). This micro-level literature
has been concerned almost exclusively with high-tech and manufacturing industries.
There are many reasons to expect, however, that institutional quality also affects the
service sector, which accounts for an increasingly large amount of global economic
1This paper is joint work with Francine Lafontaine of the University of Michigan and Rozenn
Perrigot of the University of Rennes 1.
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activity. In fact, one important feature of many retail and service sector industries
is that firms can access customers in other countries only by being present locally,
which requires investing in these markets. In other words, contrary to what occurs
with manufacturing, there is no option of exporting from more desirable locations to
protect investments for firms in the service and retail sectors.
In this paper, we examine how firms in the lodging industry, which among re-
tail and service firms are particularly susceptible to the types of expropriation and
hold-up problems emphasized in this literature, organize their operations to maxi-
mize their returns from affiliated properties. Lodging firms historically have relied
on three different forms of organization - franchising, company ownership, and man-
agement contracts - each of which has its own equity and control implications.2 The
existence of all three modes provides flexibility in adjusting to different local market
circumstances. In particular, as we argue further below, the reliance on management
contracts, in addition to the more standard options of franchising and company own-
ership, gives lodging firms the opportunity to protect themselves against the risks of
hold-up while also protecting the value of their intangible assets.
We develop a simple model that emphasizes how variation in organizational form
decisions allows firms to protect themselves against unstable regulatory environments.
We then test the predictions from our model using a unique, proprietary dataset with
information on the organizational forms of all the international hotels affiliated with
a major multinational, multi-brand lodging company. A confidentiality agreement
prohibits us from disclosing the name of the company or any specific characteristic
that might lead to its identification. For this reason, we refer to it as the Company,
keeping all references to its operations and brands oblique.
Our empirical analyses show that the Company eschews ownership in markets
where the regulatory regime is less stable. Rather than turning over operational
2We use the term franchise to mean master franchising and sub-franchise agreements as well as
direct franchising.
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control to local partners, as would occur under franchising, however, the Company
maintains operational control by using management contracts. We interpret our
findings as evidence that in unstable regulatory environments, the Company not only
faces potential risks of expropriation, but also difficulties in enforcing the type of
contracts that franchising depends upon. This in turn leads to important free-riding
risks under franchising. As a result, the firm chooses to maintain direct control and
not expose its brand value to the whims of the local hotel owners in markets with
unstable regulatory regimes.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe the international lodging
industry, discuss how organizational form decisions in this industry relate to regula-
tory stability, and present our model. In Section 3, we describe the empirical approach
and the data. We discuss our results in Section 4, and conclude in Section 5.
2.2 Organizational Form and the Regulatory Environment
2.2.1 Organizational Forms in the Lodging Industry
While most retail and service firms either operate their own properties locally or
rely on franchisees who own and operate the business, a hotel affiliated with a multi-
hotel brand can be operated under either of these two organizational forms or a third
one, called a management contract. These three mutually exclusive organizational
forms differ along two important dimensions: equity involvement for the Company,
and the extent to which the firm retains operational control. The three organizational
forms are as follows:
Company owned and operated The Company is the equity owner and
full residual claimant. A hotel’s managers are employees of the Com-
pany. The compensation of these employees may contain some in-
centive payments, but the contracts are low-powered compared to
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those of franchisees, who are residual claimants (see below). More
precisely, the incentives of the hired managers are more closely tied
to promotion within the firm (i.e. to manage better/higher revenue
hotels, or move up the hierarchy) than to local operations.
Management contracts In this case, the hotel is owned by a group of
investors that are usually local to the market in which the hotel is
located. These hotel owners contract with the Company to run the
hotel under one of its brands. The Company then hires the hotel
managers and exercises the same control over local operations as
when the hotel is company-owned and operated. The Company re-
ceives contractually agreed upon management fees in exchange for
these services. These fees are normally a percentage of the hotel’s
gross revenues, sometimes supplemented by guaranteed annual min-
imum or lump-sum payments (c.f. Kehoe (1996), Contractor and
Kundu (1998b)). Note that management contracts are long term,
lasting up to, and sometimes beyond, 10 years. Finally, since the
hotel managers are employees of the Company, the incentives of the
managers under this contractual form again are more closely tied to
promotion within the firm (to manage better/higher revenue hotels,
or move up the hierarchy) than to local operations.
Franchised In this case, the hotel is owned and operated by a franchisee,
who may be an individual, a small group, or even a company, who
pays fees to the Company in exchange for the rights to operate under
the brand name. After paying upfront franchise fees and percentage
royalties on sales to the Company, the franchisee is the full residual
claimant. In that sense the franchise contract gives franchisees strong
incentives to put forth effort and maximize the profits generated
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by the hotel. The contracts also specify operations guidelines that
ensure that the hotel meets the Company’s requirements. As noted
in the literature on franchising, at times the incentives to maximize
local profits can lead to behaviors that are detrimental to the brand.
The operations guidelines are meant to protect the Company against
such behaviors and resulting costs. We discuss these issues further
below. Note that franchise contracts are also long term, with the
average contract in 2001 lasting more than 16 years in this industry
according to Blair and Lafontaine (2005).
We argue the capacity to choose among these different organizational forms for each
of their hotels gives firms in the lodging industry flexibility in how they respond to
incentive issues and market characteristics, including regulatory stability. Table 2.1
summarizes the equity position of the Company and its control over local operations
for each organizational form. As the table indicates, the organizational form choices
available to the Company entail different combinations of two distinct characteris-
tics. Hence, the organizational forms cannot be ordered monotonically along a single
dimension.
Table 2.1: Company Control and Equity Involvement Under Different Organizational
Forms
Direct Control Over Operations:
No Yes
Equity Involvement: No F M
Yes C
Notes: ‘C’ indicates company ownership; ‘M’ indicates management contracts;
‘F’ indicates franchising.
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2.2.2 Regulatory Stability and Equity
Authors have argued and shown empirically that institutional stability is one
of the most important institutional characteristics (c.f. Wei (1997), Wei and Shleifer
(2000), Henisz and Zelner (2001)) affecting firm investment decisions. The intuition is
straightforward: in countries with more unstable regulatory environments, i.e. those
where there are fewer checks on bureaucratic and regulatory authority, it is harder
for policy-makers to credibly promise not to hold-up investors.
The empirical literature on the effect of regulatory stability on firm decisions has
focused mostly on manufacturing firms, but the lodging industry is perhaps even more
susceptible to problems of expropriation and hold-up. This is because manufacturers
often can choose to locate outside more problematic markets and rely on exports to
serve such markets. Firms in the lodging industry, in contrast, must have a physical
presence if they are to serve a given market. This, combined with the relative lack of
alternative uses for their assets, makes the hospitality industry especially vulnerable
to potential ex-post policy or regulatory changes. Moreover, much like the telecom-
munications, manufacturing and energy industries that have been the mainstay of
the literature on the economic impact of institutional quality on firm behavior and
performance (e.g. Henisz and Zelner (2001), Smarzynska and Wei (2002), Gutierrez
(2003)), the lodging industry is characterized by large up-front capital investments.
In the case of large resorts, these may be as much as $100 million (Contractor and
Kundu (1998a)).3
Also similar to heavy industries, hotel firms are susceptible to government in-
tervention and hold-up problems after construction. While cases of outright asset
expropriation have been uncommon for this industry, the international business press
contains many stories about sudden changes in the regulation of hotels and other in-
3Super-premium properties may cost even more. For example, the recently constructed Wynn
Las Vegas is reported to have cost $2.7 billion. MIN Media Industry Newsletter, “Las Vegas Gets
the “Maxim”-um,” 58(21), May 23, 2005.
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ternational service industries. For example, in June 2006, the United Arab Emirates’
Economic Department decreed that all hotels and hotel apartments were required to
obtain licenses to “serve alcohol, and open bars, nightclubs and restaurants which
show artistic programmes.”4 Similarly, the Venezuelan government recently forced
the temporary closure of 118 of 132 McDonalds franchises, accusing the company
of accounting irregularities. Coming on the heels of a similar move against another
American multinational, the government’s actions have been perceived as political
maneuvering by President Hugo Chavez rather than evidence that the fast-food re-
tailer was evading taxes.5
These types of unanticipated changes in the regulatory environment can have pro-
found impacts on the value of operations in affected markets. The annual reports of
major hotel brand operators like Marriott and Accor explicitly mention political risk,
economic volatility, and/or the impact of regulatory changes in their discussion of
strategy and financial outlook. For example, Marriott’s list of factors affecting future
performance includes “international, national and regional economic and geopolitical
conditions.”6 Meanwhile, a 2005 letter to investors from Accor’s CEO notes that the
company is looking to “assume greater risk in emerging markets as [those countries’]
economic and political environment improves.” The Accor Annual Report also con-
tains a table describing the challenges to sustainable growth, which includes “risks of
corruption.”7
The vulnerability of the industry to expropriation leads to our expectation that the
Company will opt for high equity stakes - company operations - only in those markets
where such holdings are relatively safe. In more volatile environments, we expect it to
rely instead on non-equity forms. But why would outside investors expose themselves
4Nasouh Nazzal, “New Rules Issued to Regulate Hotel Sector,” Gulf News, June 26, 2006.
5Ian James, “Venezuela Tax Agency Closes McDonalds Temporarily,” Associated Press, October
10, 2008; All Headline News, “Venezuela Orders Closure of 115 McDonalds Outlets for 48 Hours,”
October 10, 2008.
6Marriott, Annual Report 2005, p. 11.
7Accor, Annual Report 2005, p. 13, 106.
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to owning properties that the lodging company itself finds too risky to hold? The
answer, we believe, lies in the nature of the risks and the type of investors involved.
The trade literature suggests that these investors tend to be local business people
who are better able to manage risks stemming from the regulatory environment by
virtue of their knowledge of the local market, and/or close personal connections to
the government. For example, on May 26, 2009, Marriott signed an agreement to
manage a luxury hotel property owned by Emirates Airline and Group, the largest
aviation and travel services provider in the Middle East. The chief executive of
Emirates Airline and Group is His Highness Sheikh Ahmed bin Saeed Al-Maktoum, a
member of the United Arab Emirates royal family.8 Similarly, franchisees - including
master franchisees and area developers - are most often local business people well
versed in the characteristics of their local markets. In that sense, both management
and franchise contracts represent efficient solutions in which a certain form of risk is
allocated to parties best able to bear it.
In sum, we expect regulatory stability to be associated with an increased reliance
on company ownership, the only form of organization in this industry that entails an
equity stake for the Company. Whether the Company chooses to franchise or operate
under management contracts in countries with less stable regulatory environments,
however, is unclear from the arguments above. And indeed, we expect this decision
to rely on other factors, to which we now turn.
2.2.3 Incentives and Control
In the context of an industry - like lodging - where firms operate chains of proper-
ties, the physical distance between headquarters and local operations makes it difficult
to observe the behavior of employees. The agency-theoretic solution to this problem
is that the firm should devise a high-powered incentive contract for its local managers.
8Travelwires, “Emirates awards hotel contract to Marriott International,” May 26, 2009.
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This, in fact, is what franchising achieves: by making the local operator a residual
claimant, the firm obtains higher effort from its managers, and thus greater levels of
output (profits) locally. This solution is expected to be especially valuable when local
effort has a large impact on output, and when it is particularly difficult to observe
and evaluate the provision of such effort.9
While franchising a property addresses the local effort, or “incentive to shirk”
problem, it creates another type of incentive problem. As residual claimants, fran-
chisees bear the full cost of maintaining quality in their local property and abiding
by company policies valued by customers, but because they operate under a com-
mon brand, they share the benefits of these behaviors with other franchisees. This
is expected to lead franchisees to underinvest in such activities, and more generally
free-ride on the value of the brand.10 As noted by Brickley and Dark (1987) and
Brickley (1999), free-riding on the brand is especially likely to be a problem in non-
repeat industries such as lodging, where customers cannot discipline local operators
because they do not usually frequent the same property repeatedly.
According to Brickley (1999) and Lafontaine and Raynaud (2002), franchisors
address this problem of franchisee free-riding by including a number of clauses in
their contracts that impose constraints on the behavior of franchisees. Examples of
such clauses include specific operations procedures, input sourcing requirements, and
minimum advertising requirements. Whether or not the franchisee abides by these
rules is assumed observable to the franchisor, and the franchisee who is found in
violation of such rules can be terminated on this basis. Combined with franchisee rents
from local operations, these rules and the opportunity to terminate non-complying
franchisees yield a self-enforcement mechanism. In other words, the franchisee who
9See e.g. Lafontaine (1992) and Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for a review of the empirical liter-
ature on this topic. See also Bradach (1998) on the differences in incentive systems for company
operated and franchised properties.
10See notably Brickley and Dark (1987), Blair and Kaserman (1994), and Lafontaine and Raynaud
(2002).
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wishes to continue to earn the rents associated with being affiliated with the brand
abides by the requirements in the contract and does not free-ride.
The self-enforcing aspect of franchise contracts, however, depends critically on
the capacity of the franchisor to verify various aspects of local operations that are
explicitly constrained via contract. It also requires that non-complying franchisees
can be identified and punished. In environments where the regulatory context is less
stable, the conditions necessary to support contract enforcement may not be satis-
fied.11 In particular, changes in the perceived probability that a franchisor will be able
to terminate a misbehaving franchisee, or fear of such changes, makes reliance upon
self-enforcement to resolve the franchisee free-riding problem problematic. Consistent
with this argument, Brickley et al. (1991) find evidence that franchisors rely less on
franchising in states in the United States that have enacted laws making it difficult
to terminate a franchise contract. Concerns about the viability of termination as a
way to discipline franchisees are likely to be even larger in an international context
where objective appraisals of behavior may be difficult, and the impartiality of courts
questionable.
The arguments above suggest that the Company may choose to address the prob-
lem of franchisee free-riding in markets characterized by limited opportunities to
terminate or otherwise discipline misbehaving franchisees by having employees oper-
ate the property. As noted above, this can be accomplished either by keeping the
property company-owned or by operating it under a management contract. Under
either of these organizational forms, the employed manager’s incentives are not tied
so much to the hotel’s profits, and so he/she gains little, or nothing, by increasing
sales or profits locally at the expense of the brand. In fact, such employees stand to
lose much by behaving in ways that damage the Company’s brands, as they may lose
11Even in the United States, which typically ranks as a market whose regulatory environment is
rather stable, franchisee termination can be problematic. See Blair and Lafontaine (2005) ch. 10,
on this issue.
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opportunities for promotion if this is discovered.
In those volatile markets where the Company partners with local investors on the
grounds that they may have connections or knowledge that insulate their investments
from expropriation risks, the firm may legitimately fear an even greater inability to
discipline would-be franchisees in the event of a dispute over contract details. In
such cases, we expect to see the Company turn to management contracts as a way to
simultaneously address both the expropriation and control issues.
2.2.4 A Parsimonious Model of Organizational Form Decisions
We present a simple model that lays out the trade-offs described above and the
main effects we expect to find in the data as a result. In each period, we assume that
the Company chooses the organizational form f ∗ that, for each hotel i in country k
at time t, maximizes the expected net present value of operating the property (i.e.
V f
∗
ikt  V fikt ∀ f).12 The relative desirability of any given organizational form will
depend on how the equity and control dimensions discussed above interact with the
characteristics of the local market and the property.
Normalizing the returns to using a management contract to zero, the value func-
tions for company ownership (C) and franchising (F ) for a given property i in country
k at time t can be written as:
V Cikt = R−B(si, φkt) (2.1)
V Fikt = G(mikt)− E(φkt, si, dkt), (2.2)
respectively. In V Cikt, R is the value of the added flexibility that being the sole owner
and operator affords the Company.13 For simplicity, we assume R is the same for all
12We assume that the decision to have the property in the firm’s portfolio has already been made.
Similarly, we assume that the characteristics of the property are predetermined. This conditional
approach is consistent with the majority of the literature in this area (c.f. Asiedu and Esfahani
(2001)).
13To paraphrase an industry adage quoted in Bradach (1998, p. 2), R reflects the benefits of being
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hotels.14 B(si, φkt), for its part, refers to the expected losses directly associated with
the possibility that, during the expected life of the assets, the local government will
enact rules that capture, or in some other way reduce, the future returns from the
investment. We assume that these costs are increasing in the size of the hotel, si, and
decreasing in the level of regulatory stability of the country, φkt.
In V Fikt, G(mik) is the benefit associated with greater local effort by the franchisee
relative to a hired manager. We assume that G is increasing in the Company’s
cost of monitoring its own employees, mik. Finally, E(φkt, si, dkt), captures the free-
riding costs, namely the losses associated with local agents deviating from contract
requirements to the detriment of the Company’s intangible assets. We expect free-
riding costs to be decreasing in the level of regulatory stability φkt, both because local
operator behavior may be easier to observe and interpret in more stable environments,
and because of the decreased likelihood that enforcing the terms of the franchise
contract, including franchisee termination, would be difficult or costly. Free-riding
costs are expected to increase with the size of the hotel, si, as larger operations are
likely to generate greater externalities (c.f. Lafontaine and Shaw (2005)). Finally, we
expect E to increase with local market size or demand, dkt, since reputation damage in
more prominent markets should have larger financial consequences for the Company.
The implications of the model presented above for the relationship between or-
ganizational form and regulatory stability are straightforward. First, since both B
and E are decreasing in φ, the model predicts that the Company should opt more
often for management contracts - that is low equity investment but a high degree of
control - in markets where regulatory policy is less stable. There is strong anecdotal
evidence to support this prediction. For example, Marriott recently announced that
it plans on increasing the number of its Middle Eastern properties from 26 to 65 by
able to “tell” someone to make a change in the physical property rather than having to “sell” an
outside party on the change.
14Theory does not offer strong predictions as to how the benefits to flexibility would be affected by
factors like the size of the property, the size or development of the local market, or cultural distance.
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partnering with prominent local investors who will build and own hotels that the
company will run under management contracts.15 Given that most measures indicate
that the regulatory environment is rather unstable in many of the region’s countries,
Marriott’s decision to rely on management contracts to grow its presence in these
markets is consistent with our model’s prediction. Similarly, Accor’s 2005 Annual
Report indicates that growth in emerging markets, where regulatory stability is likely
to be low, will mostly take place via management contracts and other joint ventures
with local businesses.16
The model also implies that increased regulatory stability should be associated
with a greater tendency for the firm to take an equity position in its hotels. However, it
should also lead the Company to opt for more high, rather than low, powered incentive
contracts - i.e. franchising - because of the Company’s increased capacity to discipline
free-riding in such contexts. The combination of these effects means that the model
is ambiguous as to the ideal organizational form in countries with high regulatory
stability. Whether company ownership or franchising dominates will depend on other
characteristics of the local market and property involved. If monitoring costs are
generally low and there are significant returns to ownership (higher R), then company
ownership will be preferred. On the other hand, if monitoring tends to be costly (high
G) and R is small, we expect to see more franchising.
Finally, the model offers predictions for how other hotel and market character-
istics will affect organizational form decisions. First, we expect increased use of
organizational forms in which the Company maintains operational control, namely
management contracts or company ownership, in larger markets as market size is
positively correlated with expected reputational costs. Second, because the size of a
property increases both B and E, we expect management contracts to tend to be the
15Webwire, “Marriott to Manage Nine Properties in Saudi Arabia for Fawaz Abdul Aziz Al-Hokair
& Associates Hotels Company,” May 9, 2008.
16Accor, 2005 Annual Report, p. 70.
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organizational mode of choice for larger hotels.
2.3 Data and Methodology
We test the predictions above using proprietary data from a large, multi-brand
multinational hotel firm. As mentioned previously, a confidentiality agreement pro-
hibits us from disclosing the name of the company and any specific characteristic that
might identify it. The data, which are at the hotel-year level, describe the organi-
zational form, physical characteristics (i.e. size and location), brand affiliation, and
some operational details of all the Company’s international hotels between 1999 and
2003, for a total of 5,432 observations.17
2.3.1 Variable Definitions
We obtained the organizational form data, and thus the information needed to
construct our dependent variables, directly from the company.
We proxy for our main independent variable of interest, namely the level of reg-
ulatory stability (φk) in a country, using two different measures. The first is the
Checks index from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (DPI). It is
based on the weighted number of veto players in a political system, where the weights
are allocated based on analysis of electoral competitiveness, electoral rules, economic
policy orientation and party affiliation.18 Higher levels of stability are associated with
17The data exclude the Company’s domestic hotels, where in any case we cannot use FDI or DPI as
a predictor of organizational form decisions since these factors are expected to affect organizational
form decisions in the context of international expansion, not domestic choices. Also, for half of the
properties in a particular country, the Company changed their organizational form in the same year.
Looking through news reports about the Company’s development, these changes coincide with a
period when the Company was aggressively expanding in this country in part by purchasing existing
properties. Since the Company did not choose the original organizational form for the purchased
hotels, we do not want to treat changes to a new form for these properties as equivalent to others in
the data. We therefore exclude all the observations for that country up to the year of acquisition.
After that point, we assume the organizational forms are chosen by the Company, and thus are
comparable to the others in the data and should be included. Our results are robust to excluding
all data from this country.
18Details on the construction of the index can be found in Beck et al. (2001) and Keefer and
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institutional regimes where regulatory or policy changes are subject to multiple ve-
toes from multiple branches of government, and where the specific individuals with
veto power come from different political parties. In other words, higher scores are
associated with increased regulatory stability.
Second, since capital investments tend to flow to economies whose regulatory
regime is more stable, we use the log of annual real foreign direct investment (FDI)
inflows, in constant billions of dollars, obtained from UNCTAD, as a second proxy
for the overall attractiveness of a given market, including the effect of its regulatory
environment.19 Our preferred way of using FDI inflows is as a 3-year moving average,
which smooths away some of the data’s lumpiness. However, when we include country
fixed effects, we use the yearly data to leverage the year-to-year variation in our
estimations.
Consistent with the empirical contracting and trade literatures (c.f. Brickley and
Dark (1987), Rose (2004), Lafontaine and Slade (2007)), we measure monitoring costs,
mik, by the physical as well as cultural distance from the principal’s home. Specifi-
cally, we use the log of the physical distance (in kilometers) between the city where the
Company is headquartered and the center of the city in which the hotel is located as
our measure of distance.20 For cultural distance, we identified two languages spoken
in the firm’s major markets. We set a dummy variable equal to 1 if one of these was
Stasavage (2003). One country in one year had a very high value for the Checks index (i.e. 16). We
set this value to the next highest observed value (i.e. 8) to reduce the possibility that this outlier
drives results. Our estimates are robust to leaving them unchanged or removing them entirely. Our
results are also robust to winsorizing all observations with Checks scores higher than 5 to 5, the
highest value that is relatively frequent in the data.
19Before taking the log of FDI we had to deal with the fact that a number of countries experienced
net decreases in foreign investment in some years (in other words, more FDI was pulled out than put
in). Rather than adding a constant to make all net FDI figures positive, which would have the effect
of deemphasizing the relative importance of additional FDI in medium- and high-FDI countries, we
took the log of the absolute value of the FDI inflows and multiplied it by -1 if the original figure was
less than 0. To ensure that our transformation was monotonic, however, we first set the log equal to
0 if the absolute value of FDI inflows is less than $1 billion. The number of observations set to 0 is
small. For the overall sample, we have 82 such cases out of 4,628, while we have 29 such observations
out of a sample of 857 in the entry sample. Our results are robust also to other transformations of
the variable.
20Distances are calculated using the “great circle” method.
18
the dominant language of the country where the hotel is located.21 Language data
are from from the Macalester College Industry Trade Data collection.22 Moreover, we
anticipate that in markets where the firm has a large presence, monitoring will be less
costly as the fixed cost of traveling to the local market can be spread across a larger
number of hotels. Consequently, we include the total number of hotels affiliated with
the Company, across all brands, in the same city as hotel i as an additional measure
of monitoring costs.
We measure hotel size (si) using the log of the number of rooms in the hotel.
To proxy for market size (dk), we use the log of real per capita GDP and the log
of country population, both from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
Also, motivated in part by the discussion in international lodging firms’ investor
reports about economic as well as political stability affecting investment decisions, we
include the standard deviation of each country’s economic growth rate for a rolling
three-year window in all our regressions. In other words, the value of this variable for
a given country in a given year is the standard deviation of that country’s economic
growth over the current and two preceding years, where data on economic growth are
from Euromonitor. Controlling for economic volatility ensures that our coefficient on
regulatory stability captures the impact of this variable separately from any effect of
economic volatility. It also allows us to partially test the prediction that when returns
are likely to be more volatile, local agent effort becomes more important so that
the firm transfers greater responsibility and offers higher powered incentives to local
agents.23 This would imply greater reliance on franchising in nations characterized
by high economic volatility.
We include brand-year dummy variables to control for possibly time-varying dif-
21We estimated models with separate dummy variables for the two languages, and obtained very
similar results. Since the coefficients were very similar, we present results for the more parsimonious
version.
22The data can be accessed at:
http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/trade.resources/tradedata.html.
23See, e.g. Lafontaine and Bhattacharyya (1995) and Prendergast (2002).
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
DPI Checks 5,251 3.61 1.27 1.00 8.00
FDI 5,149 42,936 66,514 -4,192 313,997
Log (transform of smoothed FDI $B) 5,029 2.93 1.57 -0.72 5.55
Log (transform of FDI $B) 5,149 2.83 1.55 -1.16 5.75
Real GDP per capita (income) 5,252 15,681 10,463 103 46,659
Log (income) 5,252 26.65 1.58 19.11 29.96
StDev (growth) 5,353 1.40 1.43 0.10 12.34
Country Population (’000s) 5,252 77,900 143,000 388 1,290,000
Log (population) 5,252 17.48 1.23 12.87 20.98
Number of rooms 5,432 132 89 2 702
Log (rooms) 5,432 4.68 0.66 0.71 6.55
Language 5,432 0.21 0.40 0 1
Distance (km) to city 5,336 3,990 4,844 225 19,072
Log (distance (km) to city) 5,336 7.44 1.35 5.42 9.86
Number of Company hotels in city 5,070 5.85 7.38 1.00 42.00
ferences across the brands of the Company. These dummy variables control for brand-
specific factors that may affect organizational form decisions, including, for example,
differences in the amount of local managerial effort that may be required across the
brands.24
Summary statistics for all the variables above are shown in Table 2.2. It was not
possible to obtain market level data for all the hotel/years in our Company data. In
the end, we have 4,853 observations with all relevant variables and the DPI Checks
index, whereas we have 4,628 observations when we rely on the 3-year moving average
FDI measure of regulatory stability, and 4,741 observations when we use yearly FDI
data and country fixed effects.
Table 2.3 shows the number of hotel/years by organizational form for countries
with high, medium, and low levels of regulatory stability, as captured by the DPI
index. Since observations are at the hotel/year level, multiple observations of the
24For example, specific groups of amenities are offered by hotels operating under the different
brands, and these amenities likely affect the importance of local effort and the cost of monitoring
its provision.
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Table 2.3: Organizational Form and Regulatory Stability
DPI Checks Group
Organizational Form: 1-3 4 5+ Total
Company Owned 982 1,589 477 3,048
51.7% 62.5% 58.7% 58.0%
Management Contract 838 619 243 1,700
44.2% 24.4% 29.9% 32.4%
Franchised 78 333 92 503
4.1% 13.1% 11.3% 9.6%
Total 1,898 2,541 812 5,251
Notes: Number of hotel-year observations with percentage of col-
umn total in italics.
same hotel appear in the table. The first column shows data for countries that receive
scores of 1 to 3 in the DPI Checks index. This category includes countries like Côte
d’Ivoire, Morocco, and Ghana. The second columns shows the organizational forms
for hotels in countries with a Checks score of 4, which includes Argentina, Peru, and
South Korea. The final column displays the distribution of forms in countries where
power is considered most evenly distributed. This group includes the Netherlands,
Australia, and New Zealand (in most years).
The data in Table 2.3 first show that the majority of the Company’s hotels are in
countries with more stable regulatory regimes. Conditional on operating in the least
stable regulatory environments, 50 percent of hotels are company-owned, compared to
about 60 percent in countries with moderate to very stable regulatory environments.
Finally, we find more franchising in moderate and stable environments (11 to 13
percent) than in the least stable environments (just 4 percent).
These data patterns are consistent with the predictions of our model.25 However,
they may be due to other factors correlated with regulatory stability that are not
controlled for in simple descriptive statistics. In what follows, we examine whether
the same relationships arise in more systematic regression analyses.
25The results are similar if we use one observation per hotel or our smoothed measure of FDI.
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2.3.2 Empirical Specification
Organizational form decisions in the lodging industry have been analyzed using
ordered response models (c.f. Contractor and Kundu (1998b), Chen and Dimou
(2005)). These models assume the existence of a single continuous unobserved index
along which the organizational forms can be ranked. The estimated cutoff values for
the index then dictate the choice of organizational form along the continuum. We
believe that this approach is problematic in the present context because our model
suggests that the differences in organizational forms cannot be reduced to a single
dimension. This should be clear from Table 2.1 where the organizational forms differ
along two dimensions. Similarly, some of the key factors in our model - like hotel size
or regulatory stability - affect both the decision to own and the decision to franchise
in different ways. As a result, we view non-ordered discrete choice models as more
appropriate.
Our initial choice of specification was the multinomial logit (MNL) model. This
model has many attractive features, not least of which is its analytical tractability.
However, this tractability comes at a high cost, namely the requirement that the
probability of choosing one possibility relative to another must be independent of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA). In other words, shocks to the true utility associated with
the different choices must be independent and identically distributed. In a context
such as ours, where the set of alternatives is small, and no alternative is highly similar
to any other, the IIA assumption is perhaps not so problematic. However, tests of
the IIA assumption on our data using a modified Hausman test (c.f. Hensher et al.
(2005), Cameron and Trivedi (2005)) were rejected. For that reason, we turned to
the less restrictive generalized extreme value (GEV) models.
The most common GEV model is the nested logit, in which choices are grouped
into “nests” according to the likelihood of correlations in the error terms. Frequently,
these groupings are established on theoretical grounds, but as Hensher et al. (2005)
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explain, this is not necessary. One way to evaluate the appropriateness of the nested
logit compared to MNL is to consider the inclusive value parameters. These param-
eters are the estimated ratio of the scale parameter at one level of a model and the
scale parameter at the level below. Scale parameters are functions of the correlation
between the error terms of the elements within a choice set.26 In the MNL model, the
inclusive value parameters are set equal to 1 at all levels because of the assumption
that the variances of all alternatives are independent and identical. Nested logit mod-
els allow these variances to vary across alternatives, potentially leading to different
scale parameters at different levels of the model. The inclusive value parameter values
must be between 0 and 1. If the estimated value is equal to 0, the model is “degen-
erate” because the estimated coefficient implies that there is no nesting structure.
When the ratio is statistically indistinguishable from 1, the model is equivalent to the
MNL. If the ratio is greater than 1, the model violates the global utility maximization
assumption.27
Since we have only three organizational forms, a nested structure implies that
there will be two branches, one of which will have two alternatives as stems. Thus
only one inclusive value parameter can be estimated since we must normalize the
inclusive value of the branch with only one alternative to 1.
We estimated all three possible nesting structures, namely the one that groups
the two non-equity modes (management and franchise), the one that groups the two
modes that entail control over local operations by the Company (company owner-
ship and management contract), and finally the one that groups company ownership
and franchising. However, because our data are about characteristics of the property
rather than attributes of the organizational form, we can only estimate effects via
interacting organizational form dummy variables with the characteristics. Unfortu-
26See Hensher et al. (2005) or Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for details.
27In other words, this would mean that an increase in the utility associated with a specific alter-
native would lead to a decreased probability of choosing the branch it is on. For more, see Hensher
et al. (2005).
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nately, our model contains too many variables to proceed in this way. We were able
to estimate nested logit models for all nesting structures when we restricted the set
of explanatory variables to the main variables of interest, excluding our brand-year
dummy variables.
We found that the only model with an inclusive value coefficient not statistically
significantly greater than 1 associates the two non-equity forms, namely management
contracts and franchising. However, estimation of this model produced an inclusive
value parameter that was statistically indistinguishable from 1. As noted above, this
implies that the best nested model is equivalent to an MNL model. Further bearing
this out is the fact that our nested logit estimates were very similar to the MNL
estimates. As a result, we follow Train (2003) in thinking of the MNL regressions
as a worthy approximation to the true choice process, and present results from this
model.
Table 2.4: Organizational Form Changes From One Period to the Next
Current:
C M F Total
C 2,330 26 1 2,357
96.9% 2.0% 0.3% 58.3%
Previous: M 71 1,245 19 1,335
3.0% 97.6% 5.3% 33.0%
F 3 5 340 348
0.1% 0.4% 94.4% 8.6%
Total 2,404 1,276 360 4,040
Notes: Number of hotel-year observations with percentage of column total in
italics.
The MNL model connects very easily to the theoretical model outlined above.
If we add error terms to the value functions associated with each of the different
organizational forms, where the error terms are independent and identically drawn
from the type 1 extreme value distribution, and the value functions are assumed to
be linear functions of the explanatory variables X, then the probability of observing
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for j = C, M, F . The error terms capture unobserved factors that might cause the
Company to prefer one form over the others. The resulting empirical model is not
yet identified, however, because there are multiple sets of β(f) that lead to the same
probabilities. Identification is achieved by arbitrarily setting β(f) to 0 for one f . We
set this default case to be company ownership. This means that we are modeling
the effect of variables on the relative probability that a given hotel i in country k
at time t is operated under organizational form f , where f is either franchising or a
management contract, relative to company ownership. Separating X into the three
functions identified in our modeling section, this translates to:
ln
(
P (form = f)
P (form = C)
)
ikt
= −Bf (sit, φkt) + Gf (mikt)− Ef (sit, dkt, φk) + μikt
= δτφkt + β1,τsit + β2,τmikt + β3,τdkt + μikt
where μikt represents an idiosyncratic shock, and C indicates company-ownership.
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In the next section, we first present MNL results for the full sample of yearly
observations. This approach fundamentally assumes that the Company chooses or
reconsiders the organizational form under which each hotel is operated at any given
time during the period of our data. Only about 5% of the hotels in our sample,
however, experience a change in organizational form at any given time during the
period of our data. Table 2.4 indicates the frequency of such changes per hotel/year
in our data. It clearly shows that for most hotel/years, there are no changes in
28R does not appear here as it is not part of the value functions of the non-equity forms.
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Table 2.5: Full Sample Results
DPI FDI FDI FE
M:C F:C M:C F:C M:C F:C
Reg. stability -0.55*** 0.05 -0.58** -0.28 -0.35*** 0.00
[0.20] [0.22] [0.26] [0.19] [0.09] [0.09]
Local presence 0.00 -0.06*** -0.01 -0.05*** 0.02 -0.07***
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02]
Language -1.14* -2.26** -1.26** -2.40***
[0.60] [0.98] [0.60] [0.86]
Log (distance) 1.04*** 0.02 0.94*** 0.05 0.97 1.10**
[0.18] [0.22] [0.25] [0.25] [0.81] [0.52]
Log (rooms) 0.17 -0.49 0.15 -0.47 -0.21 -0.84**
[0.16] [0.35] [0.18] [0.36] [0.18] [0.38]
Log (income) -0.32 -0.31 -0.13 -0.03 -0.12 -2.79
[0.22] [0.32] [0.26] [0.29] [6.80] [10.06]
Log (population) -0.08 0.23 0.2 0.23 -17.22 -8.71
[0.30] [0.33] [0.22] [0.27] [12.08] [17.16]
StDev (growth) 0.29* 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.09 0.00
[0.15] [0.18] [0.16] [0.18] [0.37] [0.35]
Constant 30.46*** 7.34 20.74*** 0.32 338.14 214.71
[4.05] . [5.80] . . .
Brand-year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No Yes
Observations 4,853 4,628 4,741
Correctly Predicted 3,938 3,806 4,103
% Correct 81% 82% 87%
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the country-level, in brackets. * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. We were unable to identify the
constant term in the second, fourth, fifth, and sixth columns because of collinearity with
the brand-year dummy variables.
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organizational form (per the elements along the diagonal). This low frequency of
changes in organizational form suggests either that the firm has not had much need
to change the organizational form under which its hotels operate, or that it cannot
easily change these decisions. The latter seems consistent with the long-term nature
of both franchised and management contracts. However, firms do buy back franchised
properties to operate them as their own, and at times choose to franchise hotels that
were company-owned, leading us to expect that the lack of changes in the year-to-
year data mostly reflect the fact that the Company has not had much need to change
organizational form. In that case, the use of yearly data is justified. But if the
decisions are sticky, then yearly data may be at too high a frequency to reflect the
number of decisions actually made. For this reason, in our regressions below, we
cluster observations at the country level. In addition, we present a separate set of
results, obtained using only one observation per hotel. Specifically, we use an entry
subsample, which consists of only those hotels whose organizational form is observed
when they first become part of the Company’s portfolio, and we include each hotel
only in that year. Comparing the results of the analysis on this entry subsample with
those of the full sample serves as our most important robustness check (see below).
2.4 Regression results
2.4.1 Baseline Results
Table 2.5 shows the results of three MNL regressions of organizational form using
our entire sample. In the table, each model is represented by a pair of columns.
The first column in the pair shows the effect of each variable on the probability that
a hotel is organized under a management contract rather than company ownership.
The second column indicates the effect on the relative probability of franchising versus
company ownership.
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In the first set of two columns, we use the DPI Checks variable as our measure
of regulatory stability. In the second and third sets of columns, we rely on the log
of the 3-year moving average of FDI and the log of yearly FDI inflows and country
fixed effects, respectively. We include results from this last specification in partic-
ular to establish that our results concerning regulatory stability are not driven by
unchanging country characteristics. Moreover, these country fixed effects also should
account, among other things, for the possibility that some countries inhibit - or pro-
hibit outright - foreign ownership.29 We do not include country dummy variables
in regressions that use the Checks index or the other measure of FDI because these
do not vary sufficiently over time for us to identify their coefficients separately from
those of country fixed effects.
We cluster errors at the country level in all these regressions to account for the
fact that the Company’s organizational form choices may be correlated not only over
time within a hotel but also across hotels in a given country.30 χ2 tests that the
coefficients on the brand-year dummy variables are all equal to zero are rejected at
the 1% level for all but our country fixed effect regression.
We measure the goodness of fit using the share of correctly predicted choices,
where the predicted outcome for each hotel is determined by selecting the form with
the highest predicted probability. The models all correctly predict more than 82
percent of the “yearly” choices, much above the 58-59 percent that we would predict
if we used a naive model and predicted company ownership - the most frequent
outcome in the data - for all observations.
Given that the models are non-linear, to facilitate the interpretation of the results,
29We unfortunately do not have data to identify clearly the countries where this may be an issue
during our data period. Consequently, we not only estimate regressions with country fixed effects,
but also experimented with subsamples where we removed data from countries where we suspected
such restrictions might exist. We found that our results were robust across these.
30Clustering at a more aggregate - country rather than hotel - level allows for all observations from
a given country to be treated as though they are not fully independent from one another, thereby
“reducing” the sample size the most. This makes it more difficult to find statistically significant
results in the regressions, and hence is a conservative approach to the issue at hand.
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Table 2.6: Marginal Effects for Whole Sample
DPI
Company Owned Management Contract Franchised
Reg. stability 0.041 -0.057 0.016
Local presence 0.018 0.006 -0.025
Language 0.148 -0.070 -0.078
Log (distance) -0.116 0.139 -0.023
Log (rooms) 0.004 0.016 -0.020
Log (income) 0.056 -0.036 -0.020
Log (population) -0.006 -0.015 0.021
StDev (growth) -0.041 0.034 0.007
FDI
Company Owned Management Contract Franchised
Reg. stability 0.084 -0.074 -0.010
Local presence 0.020 0.001 -0.021
Language 0.160 -0.080 -0.080
Log (distance) -0.103 0.123 -0.020
Log (rooms) 0.004 0.015 -0.019
Log (income) 0.017 -0.019 0.002
Log (population) -0.031 0.017 0.013
StDev (growth) -0.023 0.020 0.003
FDI-FE
Company Owned Management Contract Franchised
Reg. stability 0.023 -0.029 0.006
Local presence 0.012 0.012 -0.024
Log (distance) -0.132 0.060 0.073
Log (rooms) 0.025 -0.002 -0.023
Log (income) 0.071 0.006 -0.078
Log (population) 0.217 -0.233 0.016
StDev (growth) -0.006 0.007 -0.001
Note: Average impact on probabilities of different organizational forms of a one standard
deviation increase in the independent variable holding all others constant. For the dichoto-
mous language dummy, the value is calculated by taking the average of the difference in
probabilities when the value is set to 1 and when it is set to 0.
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we present in Table 2.6 the average effect of a one standard deviation increase in the
independent variables. As suggested in Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 122-3) and
Greene (2003, p. 668), we approximate the marginal effects of a change in one of
the independent variables by using the average effect of such a change, rather than
calculating the effects at mean values. For the language dummy variable, the effect is
calculated by taking the average of the difference in probabilities when the variable
is set to 1 compared to when it is set to 0.
Overall, our results are consistent across specifications and strongly support our
model’s predictions about the impact of regulatory stability on the choice of organi-
zational form. In all three specifications, an increase in regulatory stability decreases
the likelihood of choosing a management contract relative to company ownership.
Moreover, the estimates of a one-standard deviation change suggest that the im-
pact of regulatory stability on organizational form choice is economically significant.
Depending on the specification, we find that a one standard deviation increase in
regulatory stability leads to a 2.9 to 7.4 percentage point decrease in the likelihood
that a property is operated under a management contract. Across all three models,
we find that this decrease is almost wholly accounted for by increased use of company
ownership. In other words, regulatory stability almost exclusively affects the asset
ownership decision.
The result above differs from others in the literature on lodging company con-
tracting. Contractor and Kundu (1998b) use hotels data where it is possible to dis-
tinguish four types of contractual relationship, which they order from most to least
company involvement as follows: first, company ownership; then, partial ownership;
next, management contracts; and lastly, franchising. Chen and Dimou (2005) do not
have a partial ownership category, but order the remaining organizational forms in the
same way. Both papers find a statistically significant negative relationship between
company involvement and country risk, implying that franchising is the dominant
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organizational form in the riskiest countries. Allowing differential effects along the
control and ownership decisions, however, we find instead that the Company eschews
ownership in the riskiest countries but maintains control.
As for the other hotel and market characteristics in our regressions, we find re-
sults that are generally in line with our model’s predictions. In particular, based on
monitoring cost arguments, we expect to find more company ownership and corre-
spondingly less franchising in cities with higher densities of hotels affiliated with the
Company, as we do. Similarly, we find that reduced cultural distance, as captured by
our common language dummy variable, increases the chances that a hotel is company
owned by 15 to 16 percentage points, while reducing the likelihood of both manage-
ment contracts and franchising approximately equally. In other words, the Company
owns more readily in markets that are culturally closer to its main markets. Increases
in the physical distance between the Company’s headquarters and the city in which
the property is located are associated with a reduced reliance on company ownership,
also as expected. Interestingly, in this case the reduced reliance on company owner-
ship is made up for by a corresponding increase in the use of management contracts,
and no change in the tendency to franchise (in two out of three models). This suggests
that free-riding concerns also are relatively high in far away markets. Finally, larger
hotels are less likely to be franchised, as expected based on free-riding concerns.
As for the country-level variables, once we control for regulatory stability, GDP
per capita and country population never have statistically significant effects on orga-
nizational form decisions.31 Finally, economic volatility, as captured by the standard
deviation of GDP growth in the country, tends to increase the reliance on manage-
ment contracts and reduce company ownership. This result does not support the
Prendergast (2002) prediction of increased delegation in more volatile environments.
31The magnitude of the effects, per Table 6, can be sizable, but consistent with the high estimated
variances, the signs of the effects in Table 8, where we focus on our entry subsample, are not
consistent with those in Table 6.
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Moreover, in models 2 and 3, the magnitude of this effect is much smaller than that
found for regulatory stability. More important for our purposes, the inclusion of this
variable does not eliminate the effect of regulatory stability. This confirms that reg-
ulatory stability plays a role in organizational form decisions that is separate from
that of economic volatility.
2.4.2 Robustness
We show results for the entry-year subsample in Table 2.7. As noted above,
these results will be consistent even if our assumption that the Company revises
organizational form decisions every year is incorrect. However, if this assumption
holds, they will be less efficient due to the smaller sample size.
In these regressions, we include observations of hotels that opened between 1997
and 2003 on the presumption that the organizational form we observe in 1999 is
still the initial one, even if we do not have data on organizational form at the ex-
act time of entry. We make this assumption in order to increase sample size, which
otherwise would include very few franchised observations. Only two models are es-
timated, because there are not enough observations to identify effects when country
dummy variables are included. As in the full sample regressions, we include brand-
year dummy variables and cluster the standard errors at the country level. χ2 tests
reject the null that the coefficients on the brand-year dummies are jointly indistin-
guishable from 0 at the 1% level. Table 2.8 shows the average effects of a one standard
deviation increase in the different independent variables.
As with the full sample, we find that an increase in regulatory stability has a
negative and significant impact on the likelihood that a hotel is administered under a
management contract rather than owned by the Company. Also consistent with our
results above is the fact that we find no statistically significant impact of regulatory
stability on the relative likelihood that a hotel is franchised rather than company
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Table 2.7: Entry Sample Results
DPI FDI
M:C F:C M:C F:C
Reg. stability -0.59*** 0.17 -0.55* -0.2
[0.22] [0.24] [0.32] [0.34]
Local presence 0.01 -0.11*** 0.01 -0.10**
[0.02] [0.04] [0.02] [0.04]
Language -0.28 -37.42*** -0.35 -37.50***
[0.53] [0.73] [0.58] [0.63]
Log (distance) 1.28*** 0.07 1.22*** 0.31
[0.20] [0.30] [0.26] [0.24]
Log (rooms) 0.14 0 0.2 0.04
[0.19] [0.28] [0.21] [0.33]
Log (income) -0.23 0.36 -0.12 0.54
[0.19] [0.25] [0.27] [0.42]
Log (population) 0.1 -0.21 0.28 -0.29
[0.21] [0.27] [0.22] [0.29]
StDev (growth) 0.15 0.08 0.12 -0.1
[0.17] [0.19] [0.16] [0.21]
Constant -20.82 -30.25 -26.55 -33.3
[39.17] . . .
Brand-year FE Yes Yes
Observations 874 857
Correctly Predicted 721 713
% Correct 82% 83%
Note: Robust standard errors in brackets - clustered at the country-level. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. We were unable
to identify the constant term in the second, third, and fourth columns because
of collinearity with the brand-year dummy variables.
owned. The estimated average effects of a one standard deviation increase in regula-
tory stability are of similar magnitude as in our overall sample. We find that a one
standard deviation increase in the regulatory stability variables is associated with a
5.9 to 6.8 percentage point decrease in the likelihood that a property is under a man-
agement contract. For FDI, this effect again is almost entirely offset by an increased
utilization of company ownership. For the DPI Checks variable, the impact is offset
by increases in both company ownership and franchising.
Our other variables also have effects similar to those in our full sample regressions.
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Table 2.8: Effects of One Standard Deviation Change Based on Entry Results
DPI
Company Owned Management Contract Franchised
Reg. stability 0.032 -0.059 0.027
Local presence 0.025 0.021 -0.046
Language 0.114 0.047 -0.161
Log (distance) -0.111 0.142 -0.031
Log (rooms) -0.006 -0.006 -0.002
Log (income) -0.007 -0.042 0.049
Log (population) 0.003 0.014 -0.018
StDev (growth) -0.019 0.015 0.004
FDI
Company Owned Management Contract Franchised
Reg. stability 0.069 -0.068 -0.001
Local presence 0.020 0.021 -0.041
Language 0.109 0.044 -0.153
Log (distance) -0.110 0.127 -0.016
Log (rooms) -0.009 0.011 -0.001
Log (income) -0.029 -0.039 0.068
Log (population) -0.009 0.037 -0.028
StDev (growth) -0.005 0.017 -0.012
Note: Average impact on probabilities of different organizational forms of a one standard
deviation increase in the regulatory stability proxy holding all other variables constant.
In particular, we find again that greater physical and cultural distance increase the
likelihood of both non-equity organizational forms. One variable that has different
effects in the subsample analyses is the log of GDP per capita, which we find to
have a small negative effect on the probability of company ownership and a larger
positive effect on the probability of franchising. As before, however, these effects are
statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
Though not shown, we have also verified that our results remain similar if we
rely on alternative measures of institutional stability, namely the Political Constraint
Index, which is similar to the Checks variable insofar as it is explicitly intended
to capture the stability of the policy environment, or the mean of the World Bank’s
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governance indicators.32 Overall, the consistency of our results between the subsample
and the full sample, as well as across different measures of regulatory stability, offers
strong support for the predictions of our model.
2.5 Conclusion
Using proprietary data from a large multi-national multi-brand lodging firm, this
paper has examined the effect of differences in regulatory stability across countries on
the way in which the Company chooses to organize its operations locally. We show
that the Company is less likely to choose to be sole owner and residual claimant when
a hotel is in a country where the “rules of the game” can be changed more easily.
This is consistent with the idea that lower levels of regulatory stability increase the
risks attached to company ownership. The firm still chooses to do business in these
markets, however, by partnering with local investors who, often because of who they
are, can mitigate the risks associated with unexpected policy or regulatory changes.
The data indicate that it then prefers to maintain operational control through the
use of management contracts rather than relying on franchising. We argue that this
occurs because free riding is harder to detect or punish in environments characterized
by unstable regulatory regimes. This, in turn, makes franchising less appealing in
such markets.
Overall, our results show that the Company’s organizational form decisions vary
significantly depending on the characteristics of the market in which a given hotel is
located, and that regulatory stability is one of the important factors affecting these
decisions. Our findings thus demonstrate that regulatory considerations can affect
the behavior of firms in the service sector as well as those in manufacturing and other
heavy industries. Our hope is that future work will consider how this effect might
32For these analyses, missing values for the governance indicators were imputed using data from
other years to maintain the number of observations in the sample. Details are available upon request.
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vary across service industries, as well as how other organizational decisions - beside
those available in this industry - might be relied upon by firms in these other sectors.
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CHAPTER III
Uncertain Regulatory Timing and Market
Dynamics
[I]n 2002 and 2003 Granger Morgan of Carnegie Mellon ... asked large
audiences which included many CEOs and other senior officials in the
power industry, How many of you believe that there will not be Federal
controls on CO2 emissions from U.S. power plants within the next 20
years? In both cases less than 2% of the people in the room raised their
hands. (Reinelt and Keith (2007, p. 102))
3.1 Introduction
In addition to obvious influences like the level of demand, firms’ investment de-
cisions depend on their regulatory context, the future of which often is uncertain.
Such uncertainty can arise in two ways. First, firms may be unsure about the specific
nature of future regulations. For example, policymakers and stake-holders currently
are debating the relative merits of different ways of reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions (see, e.g. Crook (2009)). Second, even when the nature of future regulations is
foreseeable, decision-makers still may face regulatory uncertainty if the timing of the
change is unclear. Either form of regulatory uncertainty complicates durable invest-
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ment strategies.1 As a result, when the regulatory future is uncertain, firms’ durable
investment strategies should look different than they would in the absence of this
uncertainty.
In monopolistic settings, the impact of uncertainty about regulatory changes can
be modeled using the approaches developed in the “real options” literature (e.g. Dixit
and Pindyck (1994)) and usually applied to demand uncertainty. This framework
predicts that firms in uncertain markets delay durable investments to obtain more
information. However, if the market is oligopolistic, the question of how uncertainty
affects investment becomes more difficult to answer. This is because an oligopolist’s
optimal strategy depends on the actions and states of its competitors, and the dura-
bility of investments can create incentives for oligopolists to engage in preemption
races (see, e.g., Spence (1977)). Thus, there are two opposing forces on oligopolists
facing exogenous uncertainty: 1) wait for more information about the future compet-
itive environment, and 2) act quickly in an effort to improve their position within the
market.
In this article, I examine the tension between these forces by extending the Be-
sanko and Doraszelski (2004) infinite horizon, discrete time model of dynamic capacity
accumulation to allow for a one-time regulatory change that alters the parameters af-
fecting product market competition. In my model, uncertainty about the regulatory
future is restricted to the timing of a new Pigouvian (i.e. pollution) tax designed to
cause firms to internalize an externality in their production process. In each period,
firms compete on price in the product market and make decisions about how much
to invest in expanding their productive capacity, knowing that in the long-run the
tax will reduce the industry’s profitability to the extent that it can only support one
firm. In many ways, this set-up resembles what has occurred to the market for methyl
1For example, a project that may be desirable under one regulatory regime could be unprofitable
under others. Alternatively, building a new plant might be advisable if a stringent regulatory regime
were adopted in the distant future, but not if it went into effect in the next period.
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tert-butyl ether (MTBE), a gasoline additive used to increase fuel’s octane level. Af-
ter becoming the dominant oxygenate, MTBE was found to significantly contaminate
groundwater, and it’s production has fallen sharply as a result of increased regulatory
stringency.2
I assess the impact of uncertainty on oligopolistic competition by numerically solv-
ing for firms’ Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium investment policies when the arrival
time of the regulatory change is known with certainty and when it is uncertain. Con-
trasting firms’ policy functions reveals that the standard real options understanding
of the impact of uncertainty on investment does not always hold. Depending on mar-
ket structure and the level of uncertainty about the arrival time of the Pigouvian tax,
firms sometimes invest more when the timing of the change is uncertain than when
it is known.
Two factors combine to produce these results. First, they occur because of the
type of uncertainty considered here, which involves a drop in the value of capacity.
Firms do not wish to have a large capacity overhang that will not be used once the
regulatory regime changes. Knowing exactly when the transition will take place allows
for more precise calibration of how much to cut investment if firms have large existing
capacity stocks. Second, investment is affected by firms’ strategic incentives, which
vary depending on the market structure. Because having the largest capacity stock
at the time of the regulatory change dramatically increases the likelihood of being the
monopolist, the capacity race dynamic created by engaging in capacity-constrained
price competition is amplified between firms with symmetric, small capacity stocks
that know when the change will occur relative to analogous firms in markets where
the change’s timing in uncertain.3 Similarly, the race dynamic is relatively more
intense between firms with larger capacity-stocks in markets where the timing of the
2Background information on MTBE and its regulation can be found at http://www.epa.gov/mtbe
and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Methyl tert-butyl ether.
3See Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) for discussion.
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change is uncertain. These firms continue to invest heavily even when both have
large capacity stocks because of the asymmetric payoffs to being largest at the time
of the change. Although the change may be anticipated to occur soon, the possibility
that it will not and there will be time for market structure to change justifies these
expenditures.
I subsequently analyze how firms’ discounted streams of expected profits vary as
a function of regulatory uncertainty and their capacity states. Intuitively, I find the
variation over different capacity states in uncertainty’s impact on investment behavior
recurs. In addition, using tools from stochastic process theory, I show that the impact
on firms’ investment strategies and profits also produces substantial differences in
total welfare. I find that, on average, total welfare is higher when the timing of the
regulatory change is certain, and that greater uncertainty is linked to higher costs.
These findings imply that welfare can be improved, on average, if policy-makers can
reach agreement at an earlier time, even if that necessitates a regulatory change that
is not ideal.
This article contributes to a number of literatures. First, it adds to the grow-
ing literature incorporating exogenous shocks or uncertainty into models of strategic
interaction (see, e.g., Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985), Whinston (1988), Grenadier
(2002), Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003), Murto et al. (2004), Collard-Wexler (2006),
Bushnell and Ishii (2007), Besanko et al. (2010)). Methodologically most related to
this paper is Besanko et al. (2010), which examines how demand uncertainty affects
(dis)investment dynamics. Using a different model of capacity dynamics, which al-
lows for deterministic investment and disinvestment, they find that the presence of
exogenous uncertainty can have an affect on the multiplicity of equilibria, and can
lead to both more or less aggressive investment behavior. However, in two of the
three discovered equilibria, size conveys a strategic advantage – as in this paper.
Second, the article contributes to the small but growing literature on how uncer-
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tainty about regulatory conditions in particular impacts investment and other firm
decisions (e.g. Henisz and Zelner (2001), Ishii and Yan (2004), Lee and Alm (2004),
Reinelt and Keith (2007), Wilson et al. (2009)). Unlike the current paper, the ma-
jority of previous work on regulatory uncertainty has focused on industries where
strategic dynamics do not apply. In general, the literature has supported the real
options prediction that uncertainty about the regulatory future leads to lower invest-
ment. While consistent with their emphasis on the beneficial effects of a good policy
environment, this paper indicates that uncertainty does not necessarily have a clear
comparative static with respect to investment, especially when there are significant
strategic incentives.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In
Section 3, I examine how uncertainty about the arrival of a regulatory change impacts
firm strategies conditional on the structure of the market. In Section 4, I show how
these differences affect social welfare. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Model
I modify Besanko and Doraszelski (2004)’s extension of the Ericson and Pakes
(1995) industry evolution framework to allow the state space to vary in ways be-
sides firms’ capacities. The approach is general enough to accommodate variation
in any of the parameters affecting demand, the cost of investment, etc. However, I
describe the model as used in this application, where the exogenous variation takes
the form of a single change in the marginal cost of production. Also, while the model
could straightforwardly be extended to the n-firm case, I describe the duopoly setting
















Figure 3.1: Timing of events in the game
Setting and Timing of Events
I consider two infinitely-lived, homogeneous good producers engaged in capacity-
constrained price competition in a discrete-time, infinite horizon setting. In any given
period, each firm i’s possible production capacity qi can take on one of 0 ≤ M−1 < ∞
values. For simplicity, I set the interval between the different productive capacities to
be the same. The firms have symmetric cost structures which are determined by the
regulatory state s ∈ {u, r}, where u indicates unregulated and r indicates regulated.
Figure 3.1 shows the timing of events in each period t of the model. First, both
firms observe the state of the world, which is given by (q1, q2, s), where qi indicates
the capacity of firm i in the market and s indicates the current regulatory regime.
Second, the firms compete in the product market, with each firm i earning payoff
πi(q1, q2, s). Third, the firms make their investment decisions, which (along with
depreciation) will affect the likelihood of different capacity state transitions. Fourth,







I specify that firms engage in quantity-constrained price competition (i.e. Bertrand-
Edgeworth competition).4 Demand is linear and given by the inverse demand func-
tion:
P = a− bQ,
where P is the market price, and Q is aggregate production. Marginal costs cs are
common to all firms, and are regulatory state dependent. The two firms compete
by simultaneously setting their prices (p1, p2) conditional on the capacity states, a
situation first analyzed by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) and generalized in Deneckere
and Kovenock (1996) and Allen et al. (2000).
I follow Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) in their approach to equilibrium selection.
This involves imposing the efficient rationing rule, which implies the following. If
p1 > p2, then firm 2 supplies the entire market provided it has the production capacity
to do so. If it does not, firm 1 serves the residual demand. Thus, the profit of firm
1 is p1 ∗ max{0, Q(p1) − q2}, and the profit of firm 2 is p2 ∗ min{q2, Q(p2)}. To
specify firms’ prices in different capacity states, I employ the generalized approach of
Deneckere and Kovenock (1996).5 The approach leads to the identification of three
regions: A, B, and C.
In region A, neither firm has the capacity to produce at the level that their Cournot
best-response function indicates, i.e. q1 ≤ q(q2) & q2 ≤ (q1), where q(q) is the Cournot
best-response function to a competitor producing q. In this region, the equilibrium is
for both firms to charge the market clearing price; thus, πi = qiP (q1+q2), for i = 1, 2.
4I have also solved the model assuming that the firms engage in capacity-constrained quantity
competition. The key qualitative insight of this paper – i.e. that initial conditions matter in how
firms respond to regulatory uncertainty, and that uncertainty can produce excessive investment – is
robust to this reparameterization. Details are available upon request.
5For the specifics and intuition of the approach, readers should refer to that paper.
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In region B, both firms have the capacity to serve the entire market, i.e. qi ≥
Q(0), i = 1, 2. In this region, the standard Bertrand result obtains, with both firms
charging their marginal cost and earning zero profits. In order to examine concentra-
tion over time, I assume that the firms equally share the market in this region.
Region C contains the remaining capacity states. In this region, it is assumed that
the higher capacity firm acts as the high price firm as indicated under the efficient
rationing rule.6 Thus, if firm 1 has more capacity, π1 = p1 ∗max{0, Q(p1)− q2}. The
price charged by the lower firm (i.e. firm 2) is found by considering what the lowest
possible price would be for the larger firm to generate the same profit π1 if it acted as
the low price seller. In other words, it is the smallest root to π1 − p ∗Q(p) = 0. This
price is the one that is used by the lower firm. As noted in Besanko and Doraszelski
(2004), in region C, the larger firm earns its Stackleberg follower profit, while the
smaller firm earns less than the Stackleberg leader profit. In all cases, profits of the
larger firm weakly dominate those of the smaller firm.
Capacity State Dynamics
Like Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) and Chen (2009), I assume that total pro-
duction capacity changes discretely. Discrete changes in total production capacity
can be rationalized by thinking of each increase (decrease) coming as the result of
the construction (closure) of a plant, which can produce continuously up to some
maximum amount.
Two different stochastic forces affect the likelihood of changes in firms’ capacity
states. First, the amount a firm invests x increases the probability that it adds to its
total production capacity. Like the bulk of the literature using the Ericson and Pakes
(1995) framework, I model the impact of investment on capacity state transitions as
in that paper. If some firm i chooses to invest xi > 0, the probability that it adds
6When the two firms have equivalent capacity, I make the assumption that firm 1 is the high
capacity firm. This assumption does not affect profits.
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to its capacity is given by αx
i
1+αxi
, where α is a common, exogenously-given measure
of investment effectiveness. Thus, firms can only increase their production capacities
step-by-step, and investment has a declining marginal impact on the likelihood of
increasing the capacity stock.
At first, aspects of this this modeling approach may seem un-intuitive. However,
as noted in Besanko and Doraszelski (2004), many things can disrupt capacity expan-
sions in large-scale productive industries. For example, there may be zoning compli-
cations, cost-overruns, and/or delays due to materials or labor shortages.7 Thus, it
is reasonable to assign a certain degree of stochasticity to the results of investment
decisions. In addition, in capital intensive industries like electricity it often is un-
likely that firms will want, or be able, to simultaneously develop multiple new large
production facilities.
Second, firms’ capacities also change as a result of stochastic depreciation shocks.
In keeping with the context of physical capacity, this is modeled as an individual-firm
process rather than the market-wide phenomenon in Ericson and Pakes (1995). Each
period each firm may suffer a depreciation shock with probability δ. Unlike Besanko
and Doraszelski (2004) and Chen (2009), I allow depreciation shocks to affect firms
with q0 capacity stocks (although firms can never have less than q0). Effectively,
this makes it more difficult to “re-enter” the market if a firm did not produce in the
previous period.
The overall capacity state transition probabilities for a given firm are found by
combining the depreciation and investment probability functions. Thus, if firm i is
at some capacity state qm
i, the probability of it being in state qn
i in the next period
7Majd and Pindyck (1987) present a model in which variable investment project completion rates
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if m ∈ {1, ..., M − 2}. Since a firm cannot have more than qiM−1, when m = M − 1
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Regulatory State Dynamics
As previously stated, I limit variation in the regulatory state to differences in
firms’ marginal costs. I impose that after the regulatory change firms’ costs increase.
In the first period of the game, firms learn that the market is subject to regulatory
change, but they cannot be surprised by a change that period. The regulatory state
subsequently evolves independently of firms’ capacities.8
The regulatory state’s evolution can occur in two ways: as occurring at an un-
certain point in time or as occurring at a certain point in time. Both evolutionary
methods are Markov processes, but they have different transition matrices P , where
Pi,j indicates the probability of shifting from regulatory state i to regulatory state j
between periods.
In the uncertain case, there are only two states to calculate behavior for: prior
8This is an important abstraction. However, it is difficult to endogenize this while plausibly
maintaining that the short-run decision of how much to produce is independent of the long-run
decision of how much to invest. This separation helps to keep the model analytically tractable and
is common in the literature. See Bushnell and Ishii (2007) or Doraszelski and Pakes (2007) for more
discussion.
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to the regulatory change’s implementation (1) and after it has gone into affect (2).
As noted, I impose that firms begin in the unregulated state. Conditional on the
change not having occurred yet, the probability of moving to the regulated state in
the next period is constant and given by P1,2 = λ. The regulated state is absorbing
(i.e. P2,2 = 1). Thus, the long-run probability that the industry will be regulated is
1.
Specifying that the regulatory transition process is this simple is somewhat unreal-
istic, insofar as it excludes the possibility that the risk of regulatory change increases
over time. However, I believe it captures a large amount of the caprice involved in
large regulatory changes, the basics of which may be mooted and largely agreed upon
many years before the bill is passed. The delay is often a function of personalities
and random events affecting stakeholder beliefs.9 For example, it took almost 10
years of debate in Congress before the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 passed.10
The likely nature of the future regulatory state was constant; only the timing of the
change was uncertain.
The simple memory-less formulation employed for the uncertainty case means that





. Therefore, since firms cannot be in the regulated
state in the first period, for a given value of λ, the expected period of the change
E(R) = 1
λ
+ 1. I use this information in constructing the transition matrix for the
certainty case. Unlike in the uncertainty case, when firm behavior must be estimated
for two different states, now there are R behavioral states, even though the number of
regulatory regimes remains just two. This is because firms will behave differently in
each pre-regulatory change period since the incentive to hold capacity differs as the
number of periods that will be spent in the different regimes evolves. The final state
9For example, Jacobsen (2010) documents the impact of the release of “An Inconvenient Truth”
on carbon emissions, and seems likely to have raised the profile of climate change concerns to a point
where nationwide legislation is possible in the near term.
10See Lee and Alm (2004) for details.
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represents the world once the regulatory change has taken place. The second to last is
the preceding period, when firms’ marginal costs are still at the unregulated levels, but
they know with certainty that productions costs will rise in the following period. Each
preceding state represents the equivalent period back to state and period 1, which is
when the market learns of the regulatory change’s timing. Transition between these
states is governed by a deterministic Markov transition matrix. If there are g states,
then Pi,i+1 = 1 for all i 
= g and Pg,g = 1.11
Optimal Investment Decision-making
If the market is currently in state (q1, q2, s), then an incumbent firm i must solve
an intertemporal maximization problem to determine how much it should invest. I
focus on firm 1 for simplicity of exposition.
Let V 1(q1, q2, s) indicate the expected net present value of all future cashflows to
firm 1, conditional on its current capacity, its competitor’s capacity, and the current
regulatory state. V 1(·) is defined recursively as the solution to the Bellman equation:
V 1(q1, q2, s) = max
x1
π1(q1, q2, s)− x1 + βE[V 1(q1′, q2′, s′) | q1, q2, s, x1],
where β is the common discount factor. The expectation operator E(·) integrates
over the probability distribution of all possible states (capacity and regulatory) in
the next period. Firm 1’s beliefs about its competitor’s future capacity state and
the future regulatory state are captured by the conditional probability distribution
functions Pr(q2


























′|q1, q2, s) Pr(s′|s).
Conditional on beliefs about W (·), optimal behavior reduces to a single agent
optimization problem. As shown in Besanko and Doraszelski (2004), and unchanged
by the expansion of the number of states in my model, the first-order condition (FOC)










Since the upper bound of production capacity is chosen to be at or above the lowest
capacity where a firm always chooses not to invest, regardless of the states of its
competitors, there will not be an interior solution when firm 1 has capacity q1M−1.
Therefore, I restrict consideration to qm
1 where m ∈ 1, ...,M − 2. Solving the FOC
for the optimal investment function gives:
x1 = −1 +
√
βα((1− δ)(W (qm+1)−W (qm)) + δ(W (qm)−W (qm−1)))
α
The second-order condition (SOC) reduces to:
−((1− δ)(W (qm+11)−W (qm1)) + δ(W (qm1)−W (qm−11))) < 0.
As a result, the SOC is satisfied provided a solution to the FOC exists. Therefore,
the firm’s optimal strategy function will be:









when q1m is not at the highest level.
Equilibrium and Computation
As is common in this literature, I shrink the state space by restricting attention
to symmetric equilibria and exploit the “exchangeability” of firms (see Pakes and
McGuire (2001)). The existence of a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium follows
according to the arguments laid out in Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007), pro-
vided an upper bound is placed on production capacity. I follow the majority of the
literature drawing on Ericson and Pakes (1995) in solving for the symmetric equi-
librium using a variant of the Gaussian algorithm described in Pakes and McGuire
(1994) and Pakes et al. (1993).12 I first solve for the equilibrium when the timing of
the regulatory transition is uncertain, obtaining my starting values by solving for the
policy and value functions when N = 1. These estimates are used as the initial values
in computing the equilibrium for the N = 2 case. I then solve for the “regulatory
certainty” MPE by backwards induction, using the estimates for firms’ behavior once
the regulatory change has taken place from the “regulatory uncertainty” model as
the behavior and value in the “final period.” I then solve for firms’ value and policy
functions in the period prior to the regulatory change, conditional on those values.
This process repeats until I have computed the policy and value functions for all R
periods.
As uniqueness of the equilibria is not and cannot be guaranteed, it is necessary to
check for multiple equilibria. As is common in this literature, I tested for the presence
of multiple equilibria by varying the starting points of my estimation procedure, and
consistently converged to the same solutions.13
12All programs were written and run in Matlab 7.8. Details are available upon request.
13Many papers employing the Ericson and Pakes (1995) framework and Pakes and McGuire (1994)
algorithm have not found multiple equilibria (e.g. Besanko and Doraszelski (2004), Goettler et al.
(2005), Chen (2009), Markovich and Moenius (2009)). However, other papers have found them (e.g.
Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2007), Borkovsky et al. (2009), Besanko et al. (2010)). Borkovsky
et al. (2009) present evidence that the possibility of entry and exit may increase the likelihood of
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Figure 3.2: Firm 1 Profits
Parameterization
As in Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) and Chen (2009), I assume that each discrete
capacity element is a plant capable of producing 5 units of the good. The highest
capacity M − 1 state is 9. Thus, total productive capacity is between 0 and 45. δ,
the likelihood of receiving a depreciation shock, is set to 0.3, and α, the parameter
in the Ericson-Pakes probability function that affects the likelihood that investment
is successful, is set to 0.125. As previously noted, marginal costs in the unregulated
state are normalized to 0. I impose that they rise to 1 after the regulatory transition.
The intercept of the inverse demand function a is set to 4, while the slope b is set to
0.1.
λ indicates the probability of shifting into the new regulatory state if that has
not yet happened. Because the variance σ2R of R is inversely related to λ, I say that
markets with smaller values of λ are more uncertain than those with larger. I solve
the model for three different values for λ: 0.2 (which translates to E(R) = 6 and
σR ≈ 4.5 periods), 0.1 (E(R) = 11 and σR ≈ 9.5 periods), and 0.05 (E(R) = 21 and
σR ≈ 19.5 periods).
Baseline Functions
Given the specified demand parameters, optimal single-period production choices
can be found for each combination of capacity and regulatory states. The first panel
multiple equilibria.
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Figure 3.3: Comparing Firm Policy Functions
of Figure 3.2 shows the single-period profits in the “unregulated” state for firm 1
in the market as a function of its own capacity and that of firm 2. Similarly, the
second panel shows the single-period profits after the regulatory change has gone into
effect. Intuitively, the second panel indicates the same overall patterns observed in
the unregulated market only with lower payoffs.
The two panels in Figure 3.3 show the equilibrium investment behavior in the un-
regulated and regulated states, respectively.14 Behavior in the two regulatory regimes
is qualitatively similar. However, the level of investment is less in regulated markets,
because the higher production costs mean that lower levels of production capacity are
required. In both regulatory regimes, there is a capacity race dynamic because of the
benefits of being the largest firm. This is revealed by the high levels of investment
when firms have close to symmetric levels of production capacity.
The graphs in Figure 3.4 show the value (i.e. the discounted stream of net profits)
of being in the unregulated and regulated markets in different market structures. Un-
surprisingly, they show that the value of being in the unregulated market is markedly
higher for all capacity states. They also dramatize why firms engage in capacity races:
the payoffs to being the larger firm are precipitously larger.
Another way of understanding the capacity race dynamics can be found in the
long-run steady states of the industries under the different regulatory regimes. I con-
14Because of the similar parameterizations, the first panel closely resembles panel 4 of Figure 7 in
Besanko and Doraszelski (2004). There are mild differences for very low levels of capacity, because
Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) rule out the possibility that depreciation affects firms with 0 current
capacity stocks.
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Figure 3.4: Comparing Firm Value Functions
Figure 3.5: Limiting Distributions
struct this long-run steady state using the calculated equilibrium investment func-
tions, which avoids the possibility of simulation bias. Figure 3.5 shows the long-run
probability of being in different capacity states under the two regulatory regimes,
when strategies are formed in the absence of knowledge of possible regulatory changes.
Before the regulatory change, the ergodic distribution is bimodal, and implies that
the long-run equilibrium is to have one large firm and one small one. While the lim-
iting distribution is still bimodal after the regulatory change, the equilibrium is now
to just have one monopolist serve the entire market. Given the increased production
costs, it is not cost effective for a smaller firm to make the necessary investments to
remain in the market. Thus, firms in the regulated state engage in intense capacity
races to see which firm becomes the monopolist and which “exits.”
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3.3 Strategic Implications of Regulatory Uncertainty
The Effect of Regulatory Uncertainty on Investment
In this subsection, I present an analysis of how firm investment behavior differs
depending on whether or not firms know exactly when the regulatory state will change.
I do this by focusing on their policy functions in the period they learn that the
current regulatory state will eventually change (i.e. period 1). At this time, firms
in both markets have the same expected number of periods in the unregulated state.
Thus, variation in their policy and value functions can be attributed to the relative
presence of uncertainty. In order to gain insight into how the level of uncertainty
affects behavior, I vary E(R). Because the expected value of being in markets with
different values of E(R) is not the same, strategies in markets with different values
of E(R) cannot be directly compared.
Qualitatively, firms’ policy functions when the change’s timing is both certain
and uncertain closely resemble those observed above in Figures 3.3.15 Moreover, the
results for the different E(R)s are intuitive. Because firms expect (know) that they
will have more unregulated periods for large values of E(R), they invest more.
However, if one looks closely, there are interesting differences between the results
for regulatory certainty and uncertainty across the different values of E(R). These are
made clear in Figure 3.6, which shows the difference between the investment functions
of firms in certain and uncertain markets for each of the E(R)s. When the difference
is greater than 0, firms invest more in a given capacity state when they know with
certainty when the regulatory change will take place than when they do not. This is
the result implied by the standard real options framework, which predicts that firms
in uncertain markets delay investment in order to gain information. However, as the
Figure shows, I find that in some circumstances firms are more inclined to invest
15Depictions of the policy functions for certain and uncertain markets under different E(R)s can
be found in Figure 3.11 in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.6: Difference in Investment Between Certain and Uncertain Markets
when the future market environment is uncertain.
When the regulatory regime is expected (known) to occur soon (i.e. λ = 0.2 →
E(R) = 6), I find more uncertain than certain investment when firms have large
amounts of capacity. When the regulatory transition is expected (known) to occur
in the medium-term (i.e. λ = 0.1 → E(R) = 11), the same general pattern is true
but for higher values of capacity. In no cases do I find greater investment under
uncertainty when the regulatory change is expected (known) to occur in the distant
future (i.e. λ = 0.05 → E(R) = 21).
The inversion of the standard real options result for firms with large stocks is
driven by the nature of the uncertainty, which concerns the timing of a negative shock.
The fact that this can be attributed to the nature of the uncertainty is demonstrated
by the fact that it occurs even in the monopoly case. This can be seen in Figure
3.7, which shows the equilibrium policies of a monopolist in certain and uncertain
markets for E(R) = 6. As in the duopoly case, a monopolist with a large amount
of capacity will invest (slightly) more when it does not know the exact timing of the
change than when it does.
The reasons for this behavior are intuitive. As seen above in Figure 3.2, the profits
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Figure 3.7: Monopoly Investment for E(R)=6
to being in the market fall markedly after the implementation of the Pigouvian tax.
Therefore, there is much less incentive to have a large capacity overhang that helps
ensure that the random depreciation shocks do not lead to exit. Those firms that know
with certainty when the regulatory regime will change make more precise adjustments
about when they should begin to restrict investment relative to firms uncertain about
the change’s timing. For capacities below this threshold, firms that know when the
regulatory change will occur invest more than their uncertain counterparts. This is
because they know that the transition is far enough away that they want to be sure to
keep enough capacity to earn high profits before the policy change. Intuitively, I find
that this relative restriction begins at lower capacities when the regulatory change is
closer.
As can be seen in Figure 3.6, however, the degree to which a firm invests relatively
more or less under uncertainty is also influenced by its competitor’s capacity. This
reflects the effects of the strategic interaction between firms. As seen in Figure 3.5,
in the long-run, there is only room in the regulated market for one firm. Thus,
when the regulatory change is (expected to be) close, firms adjust their investment
patterns depending on whether or not they have already achieved or still can achieve a
dominant position. Their beliefs about the threshold beyond which it no longer makes
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sense will vary depending on E(R) and whether or not they know with certainty when
the change will occur.
In general, the greatest relative increase in investment by firms in certain markets
occurs when firms have low but relatively symmetric stocks of capacity. In this
case, firms have an incentive to race to establish themselves as the dominant firm by
the time of the regulatory change so that they earn the monopoly profits indefinitely
thereafter. Investment by firms in uncertain markets still has a capacity race dynamic
– as can be seen in Figure 3.11 in Appendix A – but it is moderately less pronounced
because it is not certain that the firm must achieve a dominant position so soon.
Because firms earn the lowest profit when both have very large capacity stocks,
the largest reductions in certain investment occur when a firm has a lot of capacity
but not as much as its competitor. The smaller firm slows its investments because it
realizes that there is little likelihood that it will become dominant, so it makes more
sense to earn profits as a low-capacity firm in the remaining unregulated periods. By
contrast, firms in similar capacity states that only have an unbiased estimate of when
the regulatory change occurs continue investing comparatively aggressively. They do
this as there is a reasonable chance of achieving an inversion in the market structure,
and there are lopsided payoffs to achieving it.
Although the setting is very different, we can relate these findings to Hartman
(1972) and Abel (1983), where assumptions about the convexity of the marginal
product of capital produced the opposite prediction of the real options literature.
The combination of strategic incentives and the nature of the regulatory change in
this setting sharply increase the marginal product of additional capital in some in-
dustry structures, which leads to greater investment under uncertainty in some cases.
Overall, these results indicate there is no clean comparative static for the effect of
regulatory uncertainty on oligopolists. In order to predict how firms will respond to
uncertainty, an understanding of the initial market structure is needed.
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My results can also be related to previous work on strategic interaction in declining
industries. The model utilized here generates results that contrast with those of
Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985), whose model predicts that in a shrinking market, it
is the largest firms that exit first. In large part, the difference in the results can be
attributed to their modeling assumption that firms must either fully utilize capacity
or exit. By contrast, I allow firms to leave capacity idle; moreover, firms can shrink
by ceasing to invest to offset the depreciation results. Instead, my results are similar
to those of Whinston (1988), who shows that size conveys an advantage in declining
markets to multi-plant firms when plant sizes are symmetric. This paper’s results on
firms’ equilibrium policies also resemble, in some ways, those of Besanko et al. (2010),
who find multiple equilibria in their assessment of demand uncertainty’s impact on
investment dynamics. However, in two out of the three equilibria that they uncover,
size bestows strategic benefits on firms as seen in this paper.
The Value of Certainty
This subsection considers how firms’ value functions differ according to whether
or not the timing of the regulatory change is certain or uncertain. Intuitively, the
results show the same general relationship as in Figure 3.4.16 As before, there are
differences based on whether the timing of the change is certain or not. Figure 3.8
shows this difference for each possible capacity state for the different values of E(R).
For the most part, the Figure is consistent with the comments of industry experts
and leaders that they prefer the regulatory horizon to be clearly defined.17 However,
in some instances, the value of firms is higher when the regulatory change’s timing
is uncertain. As before, these occur mainly when E(R) = 6. I find that firms with
16Depictions of value functions in the different markets for different E(R)s can be found in Figure
3.12 in Appendix A.
17For example, General Electric’s CEO, Jeffrey Immelt, in an editorial about climate change
regulation states, “All that we ask for - and this will allow us to grow as a healthy, responsible
company - is consistency” (Kosterlitz (2009)).
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Figure 3.8: Difference in Value Functions Between Certain and Uncertain Markets
zero capacity stock facing competitors with large capacity stocks are worse off when
the change’s timing in certain. This is consistent with the previous discussion. In
such situations, it is virtually certain that they will not be able to invert the market
structure and become the long-run monopolist. Similarly, if both firms have at least
q7, I find that they have lower values in certain markets, which reflects that they
are likely to experience multiple periods of 0 profits until depreciation and stochastic
investment shocks establish a dominant large firm and an eventual exiting small one.
3.4 Welfare and Regulatory Uncertainty
Having established that uncertainty about the timing of a regulatory change has
a significant impact on oligopolists’ investment and value functions, I now explore the
implications these differences have for market structure and social welfare.
Methodology
I present the average values of a variety of industry performance metrics in differ-
ent periods t below. I determine these values in the following manner.
First, I determine the starting state. This could be any possible combination of
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capacities q1, q2 and regulatory regime s. However, my baseline initial state is the
ergodic distribution of the unregulated regime shown in the first panel of Figure 3.5.
I make this assumption because most regulatory changes occur to mature industries
that evolved for many years without grounds for assuming the likelihood or severity
of future regulation.18
Let E be the vectorized matrix of probabilities underpinning Figure 3.5 that the
industry is in any given capacity state. Similarly, let X be the vectorized matrix of
values of some industry metric (e.g. profits, investment, concentration, etc.) condi-
tional on the capacity state. Then, the average value of that metric in the first period
of the model will be x̂1 = E
′X. For any subsequent period t, the average value will
be x̂t = E
′M t−1X, where M is the Markov transition matrix for all combinations of
capacities and regulatory states.
Graphical Analysis
I begin by graphically analyzing differences across the values of E(R) for industry
concentration, aggregate industry investment, and aggregate profits.
Figure 3.9 shows the average value of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) at
every period for the different modes of regulatory transition. As noted above, the
arrival of the Pigouvian tax ultimately leads one firm to leave the market by letting
depreciation reduce its capacity stock to 0. Thus, the long-run concentration rate
is around 1 – i.e. a monopoly. Figure 3.9 indicates that there are not dramatic
differences across values of E(R) for each mode of transition. As with the investment
and value functions examined above, however, there are distinct differences between
the uncertainty and certainty cases. Consistent with the fact that regulatory changes
18I have also explored the implications of choosing other initial states. In particular, I focused
on the implications for “new” industries, where both firms start out at q0. Intuitively, I find that
the average behavioral differences between uncertainty and certainty are smaller, but the same
qualitative differences between the two remain. Details on these and other results for different
initial conditions are available upon request.
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Figure 3.9: Concentration Across Regulatory States
begin occurring immediately in the regulatory uncertainty case, these markets begin
to converge to the long-run level of concentration in regulated markets first. By
contrast, the regulatory certainty case starts converging later. The reason for this is
as follows. Referring to Figure 3.5, it is clear that there is a non-trivial probability that
there will be two firms with significant capacity stocks. Until one of them establishes
itself as dominant, these markets will thus be more concentrated. However, once this
has been established, the markets increase in concentration rapidly, even overshooting
the longrun steady state before converging back to it.
The corollaries to the differences in concentration appear in Figure 3.10, which
shows the average aggregate industry investment and profits during each period by
firms in each type of market. The first column shows average investment patterns in
certain markets. When the Pigouvian tax’s arrival time is known, average investment
is initially higher. This is the period during which firms aggressively invest to achieve
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Figure 3.10: Comparing Investment and Profits Across Regulatory States
a position of dominance. Once this has been established, investment falls below the
mean level in the uncertain markets until the period of the regulatory change, at
which time it begins to rise back to the long-run level for regulated markets.
The second column of graphs in Figure 3.10 shows the variation in cumulative
per period profits across the different regimes. When firms know the exact date of
the regulatory change, profits spike just before the regulatory state switches. This
reflects the “exit” of low-capacity firms’ before the switch, a consequence of reduced
investment and the depreciation shocks, so that the remaining high-capacity firms
earn monopoly profits even before the regulatory change. After the changeover, a
brief period of low profits occurs. This reflects the fact that some of the certain
markets still contain firms with sufficient capacity that all firms earn zero profits. As
expected, profits in the regulatory uncertainty markets display no sharp variations,
slowly converging to the always-regulated market average.
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Net Present Value Estimates
Having established that significant differences exist in how firms respond to the
prospect of certain vs. uncertain regulatory change, the question of cumulative impact
remains. I assess this question by calculating net present value (NPV) estimates using
the average values considered in the previous subsection and the discount factor β.
As in Figures 3.9 and 3.10, I limit consideration to the 100 periods following the
discovery that the regulatory state is subject to change. Thus, the NPV of a given




Using this approach, I consider differences in profits, investment, environmental
damages, consumer surplus, and total welfare for each of the three values of E(R) be-
ing considered. Total welfare is the sum of industry profits and consumer welfare net
of environmental costs and investment expenditures. Consumer welfare is straightfor-
wardly calculated using the linear demand curve, and the equilibrium price functions.
To determine the environmental costs, I assume that the Pigouvian tax exactly off-
sets the externality. Therefore, the net present value of the environmental costs may
be calculated as the net present value of all production multiplied by the change in
marginal costs. The results are shown in Table 3.1. As previously noted, I cannot
directly compare results when the value of E(R) is not the same. Instead, I emphasize
similarities and differences in the relationships between the different transition modes
across the values of E(R).
Examining the NPV estimates, I find that regulatory certainty always produces
higher total welfare. Moreover, the relative benefit of certainty increases in the level
of uncertainty about the arrival time of the regulatory shock (i.e. it is inversely cor-
related with E(R)). When the arrival time is fairly certain, society can be improved,
on average, 3.3 percent by making it definite. However, when the arrival time is quite
difficult to predict, total welfare can on average be raised 8.5 percent by making the
timing known. Consistent with the analysis of firm policies in Figures 3.6 and 3.10,
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Table 3.1: Net Present Values
E(R) = 6 E(R) = 11 E(R) = 21
RU RC RU RC RU RC
Profits 471.0 477.8 503.8 520.8 542.6 573.5
Investment 72.3 70.9 80.3 79.4 92.2 97.4
Environmental Costs 340.5 341.1 359.9 365.0 385.1 402.0
Consumer Surplus 266.4 269.3 293.0 302.9 326.8 351.2
Total Welfare 324.6 335.2 356.7 379.2 392.0 425.3
% Gain in Total Welfare 3.3% 6.3% 8.5%
% Gain in Investment -2.0% -1.1% 5.6%
Table 3.1 indicates that on average the NPV of investment spending is greater under
uncertainty than certainty when the regulatory change is anticipated to occur soon.
This is true for both E(R) = 6 and E(R) = 10. Consistent with the analysis above,
the NPV results suggest that firms earn the highest net profits when they know the
industrial environment’s trajectory.
Overall, my results imply that there are real costs to leaving policy uncertain,
although the magnitude will vary with the level of regulatory uncertainty. I find that
one of the drivers of these costs is that uncertainty about the timing of a regulatory
change can lead to inefficiently large amounts of investment spending as firms try
to position themselves as the market leader in the smaller post-regulation markets.
Though it is implausible to imagine that periods of policy uncertainty can be done
away with completely, the model’s results indicate that policy-makers should keep
in mind that firms in concentrated industries rationally respond to uncertainty by
modifying their investment strategies. A prolonged debate over comparatively small
elements of the ultimate regulatory package may therefore lead to worse outcomes. As
a result, sometimes accepting a second best solution may be better than fighting for
an optimal approach. The results also offer yet more evidence of the economic costs
imposed by weak political institutions, which prevent firms’ from making confident
forecasts about future market conditions (see, e.g., Henisz and Zelner (2001) and
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Wilson et al. (2009)).
3.5 Conclusion
Contributing to a growing literature on how firms cope with both exogenous and
strategic uncertainty, this article uses a model based on the Ericson and Pakes (1995)
framework to consider how capacity-constrained competitors adjust their investment
strategies in response to uncertainty about the timing of a Pigouvian tax. I find that
this form of uncertainty has different impacts depending on the level of uncertainty
and firms’ relative position within the market. Contrary to the predictions of the real
options literature, my results show that firms sometimes actually invest more when
the timing of the regulatory change is uncertain. This occurs for two reasons. First,
knowing when the change will occur allows firms to better calibrate their investment
strategies to avoid carrying excess capacity into the regulated world. Second, firms
in uncertain markets have a stronger strategic incentive to keep investing in an effort
to invert (maintain) asymmetric market structures. By contrast, firms in certain
markets are more likely to acquiesce to the status quo.
In addition to comparing firm strategies in relation to uncertainty, I also use the
equilibrium policy functions to calculate the impact on social welfare of the mode
of regulatory change and whether it varies with the level of uncertainty. The re-
sults indicate that total welfare is consistently maximized by fixing the timing of the
regulatory change. This suggests that on average total welfare can be increased if
policymakers settle for the good rather than holding out for the ideal.
These results have broad implications insofar as they demonstrate that the pres-
ence of uncertainty may not have consistent effects across industries or markets,
depending on their level of concentration and the nature of the uncertainty. This
indicates the need for careful consideration of initial conditions before making pre-
dictions about the implications of changes in the level of uncertainty in concentrated
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industries.
Although I focus the narrative on regulatory uncertainty, the model could straight-
forwardly be modified to consider situations where other market primitives are subject
to exogenous variation. For example, it could be used to model behavior in contexts
where a technological breakthrough is anticipated but not known with certainty; this
might be associated with variation in entry or exit costs as well as production cost pa-
rameters. Alternatively, the uncertainty might be associated with factors influencing
the level of demand. In future work, I plan to explore how the model can be expanded
to incorporate a richer set of dynamics such as allowing firms to hold different types




Figure 3.11: Comparing Policy Functions for Certain and Uncertain Markets
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Figure 3.12: Comparing Value Functions for Certain and Uncertain Markets
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CHAPTER IV
Brand Effects and Entry Deterrence: An
Examination of Spatial Preemption
4.1 Introduction
Industrial economists have long sought to understand the durability of market
power (e.g. Bain (1956)). Since the late 1970s, game theory has been used to ex-
amine how firms in a variety of settings might reduce competitive pressure by en-
dogenously deterring entry. The core insight of the vast resulting literature has been
that an observable decision by an incumbent can deter entry if it provides a credible
commitment to compete aggressively in future periods.1 The specific nature of the
entry-deterring decision will vary depending on the nature of competition in the mar-
ket. For example, Spence (1977) and Dixit (1980) show that when firms compete in
quantities, the desire to deter entry creates incentives for capacity investment above
and beyond what would occur if firms’ decisions were not observable. Analogously, in
markets where firms compete by offering differentiated products, Schmalensee (1978)
and Eaton and Lipsey (1979) show that incumbents may deter entry by pre-emptively
introducing new goods into the product space. Such “spatial preemption” deters en-
try because the entrant’s product will not be able to attract enough consumers to
1See section 1 of Wilson (1992) and chapter 8 of Tirole (1988) for seminal contributions to the
industrial organization literature.
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offset their fixed costs of entry.
Despite strong theoretical predictions, however, the empirical evidence for entry
deterrence has been ambiguous, especially for spatial preemption.2 In some instances,
it seems clear that firms are not engaging in entry deterrence, and there may even be
a first mover disadvantage (e.g. Johnson and Parkman (1983), West (1992), Burton
(1994)). In other cases (e.g. Stavins (1995), Berry and Waldfogel (2001)), the evidence
is strongly supportive. Moreover, Smiley (1988) finds that managers of firms with
mature products attempt to limit entry by filling all product niches.
In this paper, I argue that incorporating consumer heterogeneity and brand loyalty
may explain the disconnect between the strong theoretical and ambiguous empirical
literatures. Both factors have emerged as important stylized facts in recent empirical
work on differentiated product demand (e.g. Berry et al. (1995)) and have begun
to be incorporated into new theoretical models of differentiated product competition
(e.g. Rotemberg (2010)).
I begin by presenting a game-theoretic model of entry deterrence that allows brand
affiliation to heterogeneously affect consumers. The model shows that preemption
will be harder to sustain as consumers are more influenced by branding. This occurs
because the presence of a brand identifier in consumers’ utility functions makes the
cross-price elasticities higher for products from the same firm. Thus, brand awareness
amplifies within-firm cannibalization, which lowers the benefit to an incumbent of
adding an additional product. The model indicates, however, that firms can soften
this cannibalization through “sub-brand proliferation” strategies, as suggested by
Schmalensee (1978).
I test the model’s predictions about spatial competition using data on the Texas
lodging industry. With high margins, large multi-“product” oligopolists, and high
levels of concentration, it seems natural to expect entry deterrence to occur in this
2See Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) and Geroski (1995) for surveys of the early empirical
literature.
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industry. However, lodging companies also spend considerable time and effort building
up consumers’ valuations of their brands.3 Consistent with my model’s predictions re-
garding the impact of large brand effects, I find little evidence that large hotel brands
engage in preemption. Instead, the data show that, on average, incumbent brands
accommodate entry from new brands, as well as expansion by other incumbents with
smaller portfolios. This result is robust to explicitly controlling for the intensity of
the threat of entry (see, e.g., Dafny (2005), Ellison and Ellison (2007), Goolsbee and
Syverson (2008)).
I further test the theoretical model by exploiting data on each hotel’s revenues.
The model indicates that the reason preemption does not take place in the presence of
strong brand preferences is that cannibalization is particularly pronounced. I test this
implication by looking at the impact of market structure on individual hotel reviews.
I find that the absence of spatial preemption is consistent with much larger within-
brand than inter-brand competition. On average, the presence in a market of another
hotel affiliated with the same brand leads to a 17.5 times larger reduction in revenues
than a hotel affiliated with a competing brand. This suggests that even if affiliated
hotels compete more “softly” with each other in price, consumers’ brand preferences
mean that the brand largely splits the same pool of customers. Also, consistent with
the model’s predictions, the data indicate that brands reduce the extent of intra-
brand cannibalization through the use of sub-brands. Thus, the presence of a hotel
of the same sub-brand has twice as negative an impact as one that is from a different
sub-brand.
One of the main advantages of focusing on the hotel industry is that unlike the
majority of the retail sector, local hotel-owners are not restricted to working with just
one franchisor. Reframing the model to consider the choices of the local owners sug-
3See, e.g., the articles and discussion on the industry trade website:
http://www.hotelmarketing.com. Additionally, many hotel brands are ranked in the annual
“Superbrands” issue in Brandweek.
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gests that these decision-makers should be able to deter entry by other local owners
through the introduction of new hotels associated with new brands. This mitigates
cannibalization and fills up the product space more effectively than a decision-maker
restricted to a single brand could. Unfortunately, changes in individual owners’ port-
folios are too hard to track in the data to permit explicit tests for spatial preemption.
Instead, I present evidence that owners’ new hotels are affiliated with new brands.
This result does not demonstrate preemption, but is consistent with that type of
behavior.
Overall, the empirical analysis of the Texas lodging industry support the theoreti-
cal model’s predictions about the relationship between branding and spatial competi-
tion. More generally, the paper has implications for where scholars and practitioners
should expect entry deterrence strategies to be effective. It indicates that in indus-
tries like lodging or fast-food, where brand affiliations play a large role in determining
consumer interest, spatial preemption is unlikely. By contrast, when consumers are
unaware of or unaffected by products’ brands, as in radio markets or breakfast cere-
als, spatial preemption may be sustained. These predictions appear broadly upheld
by other papers in this literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model and its
empirical implications. Section 3 describes the institutional details of the lodging
industry and the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the econo-
metric approach to looking at lodging companies’ entry and expansion decisions, and
then presents the main results of the empirical analyses of this behavior. Section 5
extends the empirical analysis, examining the impact of market structure on hotel
revenues as well as the behavior of hotel owners. Section 6 concludes and suggests




In an influential paper, Judd (1985) provides a theoretical foundation for under-
standing the uneven evidence for spatial preemption. Using a duopoly model with two
product segments and allowing for the possibility of exit, he shows that preemptive
expansion by the incumbent into both product segments is not always credible. De-
pending on the intensity of inter-segment competition, an incumbent with products
in both segments may withdraw from an entered segment, because intense compe-
tition there could cannibalize sales from the segment where the incumbent still had
a monopoly. In such circumstances, spatial preemption by the incumbent into both
segments would not be credible. Thus, Judd (1985) suggests that cannibalization is
the key to understanding when spatial preemption will occur. However, the paper
does not offer intuition for predicting when cannibalization will be so pronounced as
to make entry deterrence unprofitable for incumbents.
I argue that recent work in empirical industrial organization does provide such in-
tuition. Whereas the early theoretical literature on preemption used one-dimensional
models of the product space (e.g. Hotelling (1929), Salop (1979)), the growing struc-
tural demand estimation literature (e.g. Berry et al. (1995)) has exploited economet-
ric methods that allow the product space to be multi-dimensional.4 In these models,
consumers are assumed to derive utility from different goods based on those goods’
“portfolios” of characteristics. Moreover, different consumers are allowed to have het-
erogeneous tastes for different product characteristics (see, e.g., Berry et al. (1995),
Train (2003)). For any given consumer, the products whose portfolios of character-
istics lead to similar levels of utility will be closer substitutes. Across a variety of
industries, the empirical literature on demand for differentiated products has con-
4See Anderson et al. (1992) or Train (2003) for surveys of the methods used to estimate these
demand models.
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sistently found that branding is one of the most important characteristics affecting
consumer utility and, therefore, product demand.5
Intuitively, the relative magnitude of consumers’ brand preferences can help ex-
plain when cannibalization will be particularly pronounced. When the utility con-
sumers derive from goods is very affected by their brand, the payoffs to adding an
additional identically-branded good will be smaller, ceteris paribus, because it will
attract fewer additional consumers than if it had a different brand. This will have
the effect of exacerbating the cannibalization effect. Moreover, the close similarity
between two identically branded products leaves comparatively abundant space for
entry. Thus, when branding is particularly important, spatial preemption is less likely
to take place.
Below, I formalize this intuition using a model of strategic product introduction.6
4.2.2 Model Overview
My model is a version of the standard three-stage game used in many papers on
the subject (e.g Judd (1985), Ellison and Ellison (2007)).7 To make the connection
with the following empirical section straightforward, I discuss the model in terms of
hotels.
I consider markets with two potential competitors: the incumbent I and the en-
trant E, both of which are brands known to consumers. The brands are rational and
5See discussion and extensive citations in Hui (2004), Goldfarb et al. (2009) or the recent review
by Keller and Lehmann (2006). These findings are now being incorporated in theoretical work (e.g.
Tadelis (1999), Rotemberg (2010).
6This is not the first paper to incorporate (random) brand preferences into a model of oligopolistic
competition. Similar to Judd (1985), the literature has considered the extent to which brand-
linkages affect the extent of firms’ diversification (e.g. Katz (1984), Gilbert and Matutes (1993),
Desai (2001)). These papers demonstrate that the presence of brand effects alters the length of firms’
product lines. However, none sheds light on the specific issue of how they impact the credibility of
preemption.
7For simplicity, I abstract from the evolution of exogenous demand conditions. However, the
demand model I employ would allow for straightforward incorporation of these issues or additional
variation in the product space. Moreover, the model could easily be extended to a richer setting
that allows for variation in the costs of exit and entry (e.g. Pakes et al. (2008)). However, I believe
that little additional intuition would be gained from the added complexity.
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Figure 4.1: Timing of events in the game
foresighted, and they make decisions about investment (and disinvestment) sequen-
tially. Figure 4.1 shows the timeline of their decisions. First, the incumbent, who
already has one hotel in the market, decides whether to add a second hotel. Second,
the entrant has the option of opening a single hotel of its own. When opening a
new hotel, both brands pay a non-negative fixed entry cost φ. Third, and finally, the
incumbent has the option of closing its new hotel. If the incumbent closes the hotel,
it receives its fixed scrap value κ.8
Once the incumbent has made its disinvestment decision, the market structure is
fixed. Both brands then choose the prices they wish to charge at their various hotels.9
They subsequently earn the profits implied by the market structure (NI , NE), where
Ni represents the number of hotels in the market affiliated with firm i.
I assume that brands play sub-game perfect strategies. Thus, the incumbent will
not open two hotels if it knows that it will close one in the event that entry occurs.
Similarly, if the market can only support two hotels and the incumbent will not
withdraw one hotel from the market after entry, then the entrant will not challenge
the incumbent if it opens two hotels.
8It is reasonable to allow κ to be negative. In this case, κ would represent an exit cost, which
might occur if there are clean-up costs such as exist in some manufacturing industries.
9Because the products are horizontally differentiated, an incumbent with two hotels will charge
the same price in both.
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4.2.3 Consumer Demand and Firms’ Variable Profits
Demand for lodging stems from a mixed (i.e. random-coefficients) logit demand
system (see, e.g., Train (2003)). The mixed logit model permits product character-
istics to heterogeneously affect consumer utility, which I use to account for variation
in consumers’ preferences for firms I and E.10 All potential consumers in the market
maximize their utility by selecting whether to stay in a hotel or take the outside op-
tion. The utility that consumer i gains from choosing a given hotel j affiliated with
brand B is:
Vi,j = δ − pj + μi,Bj + εi,j, (4.1)
and:
Vi,o = μi,o + εi,o (4.2)
where o is the outside option. δ indicates the baseline benefit to all consumers of
staying in a hotel and is common to all hotels. pj is the price charged at hotel j. μi,Bj
captures consumer i’s tastes for brand B.11 All the μ represent independent draws
from identical distributions, which have variance parameter σ2. Note that while the
draws will be independent across consumers and firms, hotels associated with the
same brand will share the same μ.12 The εi,j are independent draws from an extreme
value distribution.
The different choices’ market shares are determined by integrating out all of the
10The mixed logit demand system also has the benefit of extending straightforwardly to n-firms,
unlike previous models of differentiated competition endogenizing brand linkages (e.g. Gilbert and
Matutes (1993)).
11For the sake of simplicity, I assume that consumers are homogeneous in how they perceive the
value of lodging and its price.
12It is worth noting that while I assign a utility shifter to the outside option, this could be
normalized to 0 with no qualitative effect on the results.
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where f(μ) is the joint density function of consumers’ random brand utility shifters.
Thus, hotel j’s share of the market as a function of its own price (pj) and the prices
of all other hotels in the market (p−j).
I assume that marginal costs are 0, but being in the market requires payment of
a fixed cost f in each period.13 Thus, normalizing the size of the market to 1, the
profit of hotel j affiliated with brand B can be written as:






While the mixed logit formula has the advantage of allowing me to account for
important stylized facts like the role of branding and consumer heterogeneity, the
presence of the random brand utility shifters (i.e. the μ) means that there are no
analytic solutions for elements of interest (e.g. optimal prices, profits). Nevertheless,
the consequences of the demand system (explored through numerical simulations)
are intuitive. As the variance of μ increases, each firm will have more market power,
because the share of the population that has very strong preferences for their brand
(and low valuations for the alternatives) increases. This allows them to charge higher
prices and earn higher revenues, all else equal. However, it also increases the number
of people for whom branding trumps most other considerations, and who will not find
hotels associated with one brand substitutes for another.
13As noted in Kalnins (2006), marginal costs are very low in the hotel industry relative to fixed
costs, justifying this abstraction.
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4.2.4 Multiple Outcomes
Depending on the model’s parameterization, different equilibrium market configu-
rations are possible. For example, for some combinations of the parameters, a market
will not be able to sustain more than the original hotel. In other markets, three hotels
could be sustained. In the remainder of this section, I focus on the interesting case
when the market can only support two hotels, regardless of which brands they are
affiliated with.14
Specifically, I now examine how variation in the parameters affects the threshold
where preemption (i.e. opening two hotels) by the incumbent is credible. When these
threshold conditions are violated, preemption will not be sub-game perfect, and the
incumbent will only open one hotel, thereby allowing entry.
4.2.5 Branding and Spatial Preemption
Assuming that a single decision-maker chooses the prices of all the incumbent’s
hotels to maximize combined profits, entry deterrence will not be credible (and there-
fore will not be attempted) when it is more profitable for the incumbent to remove
one of its two hotels from the market once it sees that the entrant was not deterred.
This occurs when:
RI(2, 1)− 2f < κ + RI(1, 1)− f
RI(2, 1)− f < κ + RI(1, 1), (4.3)
where RB(·) represents the revenues earned by brand B conditional on the market’s
structure. The first term inside the parentheses in RB(·) indicates the number of
hotels affiliated with the incumbent, and the second indicates the number affiliated
with the entrant. Equation (4.3) shows that entry deterrence will not occur when
14Judd (1985) discusses the other cases.
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the profits of sharing the market equally net of exit costs are greater than the profits
from operating two hotels in a three hotel market net of the fixed cost of operating
one hotel.15
f and κ affect the viability of entry-deterrence in straightforward ways. As the
fixed cost of operating a hotel increases, the incumbent is less able to credibly deter the
entrant. Similarly, as scrap values increase, the region in the parameter space where
preemption occurs shrinks, because exiting the market becomes more attractive.
The model of consumer demand employed here also affects the viability of entry
deterrence. Rewriting Equation (4.3) as RI(2, 1)−RI(1, 1) < f +κ shows that as the
difference between the incumbent’s revenues when it has 2 hotels versus 1 hotel falls,
preemption becomes less credible. Because of the model of the product space, I cannot
prove analytically that this difference shrinks as σ2 increases. However, numerical
simulations show that this is the case. As firms focus more on the segments of the
population that have strong preferences about branding, which they do to extract
these consumers’ surplus, there is less scope to attract new consumers, who would
not have already stayed at the original hotel. Thus, introducing a single new hotel
into the market will do little to fill up the product space, meaning that the viability
of entry deterrence is declining in σ2.





, and the viability
of entry-deterrence for a specific parameterization of the model. It illustrates that
as the relative importance of brand-preferences increases, the magnitude of the per
period fixed costs (relative to per hotel variable profits) needed to make preemption
non-credible falls. The X-axis captures the ratio of σ2 to δ, while the Y-axis is the
ratio of the per period fixed cost f to the per-hotel revenues received by the incumbent
in a market with 2 incumbent hotels and 1 entrant. In all cases, δ = 3 and κ = 0.
15This is largely analogous to Theorem 1 (i) in Judd (1985).
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Figure 4.2: Regions of credible and non-credible preemption
4.2.6 Model Implications
Though simple and stylized, the duopoly model presented above provides three
testable implications.
First, it shows that brands’ ability to defend market power through spatial pre-
emption falls as consumers’ tastes for brands becomes more heterogeneous (i.e. as σ
increases). This occurs because of the large cannibalization effect of introducing an
additional hotel, which will increasingly outweigh the benefits of “softer” price com-
petition with an affiliated unit. Thus, it is unlikely that spatial preemption will be
detected in industries where consumers choose products in large part based on their
brand affiliation. Moreover, it implies that, ceteris paribus, intra-brand competition
will have larger negative effects on a hotel’s revenues than inter-brand competition.
Second, it is straightforward to extend the intuition of the model to show circum-
stances where spatial preemption would be easier. For example, Schmalensee (1978)
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discusses the ability of firms to create new horizontally differentiated “sub-brands”
with distinct identities of their own to leverage market power. Allowing consumers’
utilities to be affected by sub-brands’ affiliations changes Equation (4.1) to:
Vi,j = δ − pj + μi,Bj + αi,bj + εi,j, (4.4)
where b indicates the sub-brand of brand B that hotel j is affiliated with, and α its
associated effect on consumer i’s utility. Like the μ, the α are independent draws
from a known distribution. The fact that the α will differ for each consumer across
sub-brands makes it easier for firms to engage in preemption, because it reduces the
cannibalization effect.16
Third, in industries where franchising relationships are common, such as lodg-
ing, the model has different implications if the local hotel-owners can offer products






, and the viability of entry-deterrence for hotel-owners
affiliated with two different brands. The Figure shows that as the relative importance
of brand-preferences increases, the magnitude of the per period fixed costs (relative to
per hotel variable profits) needed to make preemption non-credible increases.17 Thus,
the model predicts that owners of multiple hotels should associate them with different
brands, and it should be easier for them to preempt entry than for single brand firms.
This is because, unlike brands, the local owners can spread their offerings apart in
the product space, reducing cannibalization.
16Additionally, if the assumption that the different firms’ μ are iid is relaxed, then if the mean of
the incumbent’s μ is higher, it will also be more likely to add new units as its goods are viewed as
more desirable on average. For example, Thomadsen (2007) shows that asymmetries in consumer
valuations cause McDonald’s and Burger King to have different geographic location strategies. Sim-
ilarly, if consumers had heterogeneous preferences about different segments of the market that the
different products could be placed in, then deterrence would be easier to sustain.
17For the numerical analysis used to create the Figure, each hotel receives an independent μ.
Thus, there are assumed to be at least 3 separate firms.
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4.3 Industry and Data Description
4.3.1 The Lodging Industry
According to Standard and Poors Industry Reports (2008), the American lodging
industry had annual pre-tax income of between $14 and $29 billion on revenues of
between $100 and $145 billion over the previous ten years.
Data compiled by Hotel and Motel Management (2004) show that 50% of all
hotels in the country are affiliated with 10 large brands, which often own multiple
sub-brands.18 This is true within, as well as across, quality segments. For example,
the Marriott Hotels brand includes the Fairfield Inn and Courtyard sub-brands, both
of which are in the mid-level segment. As noted above, the presence of multiple sub-
brands should facilitate spatial preemption. Moreover, in many cases, hotel markets
are small and isolated, capable of only supporting a few hotels. The high degree of
concentration, existence of sub-brands, commonality of small markets where strategic
behavior would be most likely, and large margins would all be consistent with the
prevalence of spatial preemption.19
However, product differentiation may also explain the high profitability of the
industry. While one important source of differentiation is quality (see, e.g., Mazzeo
(2002)), branding also plays a large role in differentiating hotels. Consumers’ exoge-
nous preferences for different brands are amplified by brands’ marketing strategies.20
These are large and sophisticated as evidenced by the space allotted to their discus-
sion in firms’ annual reports.21 As a result, many hotel brands appear in Brandweek ’s
18See Kalnins (2006) for a recent survey of the economics of the US lodging industry.
19Moreover, lodging is a franchising industry, which means that hotels affiliated with the same
brand in the same market often have different owners. Hadfield (1991) argues that such vertical
separation may make spatial preemption credible when it might otherwise fail. This story is discussed
more fully in Section 5.
20Such efforts are seen as particularly critical as a result of the substantial convergence of standards
within segments. For example, Shoemaker and Lewis (1999) state that in a survey of high-end hotel
managers, many could not identify the brand of pictured hotel rooms – even for their own hotels.
21For example, Accor’s 2008 Annual Report (p. 16) discusses how brand development and revi-
talization are a large part of its strategy in the hospitality sector.
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annual “Superbrands” issue listing of the most valuable brands. In addition to tradi-
tional forms of marketing, recent industry innovations include loyalty programs (see,
e.g., Shoemaker and Lewis (1999)). Like frequent flyer programs, these programs
are designed to help brands overcome the increasing standardization of quality and
services within a segment (see Klemperer (1987)). Compounding the rise of loyalty
programs, many brands have developed internet booking services for all of their affil-
iated hotels. Thus, a traveler can easily check the prices for all of a given network’s
hotels in a given market.
All of these factors should create the common brand effect used in the theoretical
model presented above, which should give the brands market power by differentiating
them but inhibit their ability to engage in spatial preemption.22
4.3.2 Data Description
To test the predictions of the model above, I use data from the Comptroller of
Public Accounts (CPA) for Texas.23 For each hotel that operated between 2000
and 2008, the CPA provide data on the hotel’s owner, capacity (in rooms), and
revenues. The hotels are identified by name, city of location, and address.24 Although
originally reported at quarterly and monthly intervals, I aggregate the data up to
yearly observations on the grounds that it takes that long to decide to and then build
a new hotel. In order to focus on the hotel and motel market (as opposed to the
boutique inn and bed and breakfast segment), I exclude observations of hotels with
less than 30 rooms.
22It is a stylized fact in the industry that the combination of marketing and inherent tastes leads
consumers to have very strong brand preferences. As an industry professional explained to me,
consumers may not exactly know why they prefer certain brands, but their behavior indicates they
will pay a significant premium for their preferred brand.
23Several other papers (e.g. Kalnins and Chung (2004), Kalnins (2004), Conlin and Kadiyali
(2006), Suzuki (2009)) interested in studying differentiated competition in the hotel industry have
also used various periods of CPA data.
24In many instances, I found that the reported name or address for a given hotel might vary
slightly from one year to the next. I systematize name and address conventions over time as failing
to account for such variation would lead to an inaccurately large estimate of the churn in hotels.
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Like Mazzeo (2002), I use cities rather than zip-codes as the relevant market defi-
nition as even cities of modest size often have more than one zip code. Moreover, this
follows the convention adopted by the industry insofar as hotels advertise themselves
based on their city of location, and guidebooks organize their reviews around cities.
However, a city-based approach to market definition has important drawbacks. It
assumes that within a market the location of different hotels does not matter. In
small locations this assumption may hold, but in larger markets, where it may be
time-consuming to get from one point to another, it will fail. Additionally, using
cities assumes that there are no spillover effects across markets. In many cases, this
also may not hold.
Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1987), I focus on geographically isolated markets
of modest size. I find such markets in the following manner. First, I use Google Earth
to determine the “centrum” of each city in the CPA data.25 Second, I calculate the
distance between each of the centrums using the Great Circle methodology. Third, I
discard those cities whose centrums are less than 10 miles from that of their nearest
neighbor or less than 50 miles from the major economic hubs of San Antonio, Austin,
Dallas, El Paso, and Houston. Then, I drop the cities that never had a population
of more than 1,000 people during the sample period according to U.S. Census data;
I also drop the resort cities of South Padre and Corpus Christi.26 This leaves a total
of 183 cities, with 1,198 different hotels and 7,286 hotel-year observations. Figure 4.3
shows the locations in Texas of all markets in the sample.
I differentiate hotels in two dimensions: quality and (sub-)brand affiliation. First,
I match the hotel names to an author-constructed data set containing the names of the
25I define the centrum to be the latitude-longitude point that the software converges to when the
city is entered into the search bar.
26The Census data can be downloaded from the Census at factfinder.census.gov. I exclude the
coastal resort cities as they had vastly more hotels than all other markets of similar size. As in
Bresnahan and Reiss (1987), I explored whether cities near the borders with Mexico or other states
are outliers. I found that excluding these cities did not affect the results, so I have left them in the
sample.
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Figure 4.3: Map of Market Locations in Texas
national sub-brands and their parent brands. Of the 7,286 hotel-year observations, 37
percent are affiliated with sub-brands belonging to 17 different national brands.27 To
control for quality, I follow Kalnins and Chung (2004) in assuming that hotels have
the average quality rating of their sub-brand, which I determine using the American
Automobile Association’s (AAA) Texas Tourbooks.28 Table 4.1 shows the number of
hotel-market-period observations associated with each of the brands and their quality
tiers, where the high quality tier is composed of all brands with average ratings of
between 2 and 3 stars.29
27A further complication is the fact that several brands in the sample changed hands during the
sample period. Baymont Suites shifted from being a largely independent national brand to part of
Wyndham’s brand portfolio in 2005; and La Quinta was acquired by Blackstone in 2005, a private
equity group. I assume that Baymont hotels were always affiliated with Wyndham. I believe this
assumption is innocuous as Baymont accounts for less 1.5% of all Wyndham hotels. I also assume
that Blackstone’s acquisition did not affect a change in La Quinta’s overall strategy. I also make the
assumption that the possibility of such transactions had no anticipatory effect on firm behavior.
28Quality averages are based off of ratings in the 2001, 2002, 2005, and 2006 AAA guides for the
sample markets. Individual hotels’ qualities range from 0 (in rare instances) to 5 (also rare) stars.
Sub-brands that do not appear in the AAA data are set to 3 stars.
29I have experimented with more narrow conceptions of the high-quality segment and found qual-
itatively similar results.
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Table 4.1: Number of market-year observations of different brands’ hotels
Quality Tier
<2 Stars ≥ 2 Stars Total
Accor 232 26 258
AmericInn International 0 6 6
America’s Best Franchising 0 15 15
Budget Host 30 0 30
Candlewood Hotel Company 0 1 1
Carlson Hotels Worldwide 0 26 26
Choice Hotels 0 595 595
Continent 0 424 424
Drury Hotels 0 2 2
Extended Stay Hotels 0 23 23
Hilton Hotels Corpora 0 213 213
Hyatt 7 23 30
La Quinta 0 209 209
Marriott International 0 161 161
Starwood Hotels and Resorts 0 13 13
Vantage 0 86 86
Wyndham 1 877 878
Independents 3,442 874 4,316
Total 3,712 3,574 7,286
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The data indicate that the hotels in the low quality tier are almost all independents
with no national brand affiliation, and that almost all independents are low-quality.
Therefore, in my empirical analysis, I focus on brands with substantial operations in
the 2-3 star segment in Texas (defined as having at least 150 such hotel-year obser-
vations), and assume that the hotels associated with smaller networks do not benefit
from the same brand reputation effects as those affiliated with the large brands. In-
stead, consumers view them as analogous to independents.30 These restrictions leave
six different large brands: Choice Hotels, Continent Hotels, Hilton Hotels, La Quinta
Inns and Suites, Marriott International, and Wyndham, which together account for
2,479 hotel-year observations (34 percent of the sample and 92 percent of all branded
hotels in the sample markets). Table 4.2 shows the sub-brands affiliated with each
brand in the sample and their average quality rating.
In keeping with the theoretical model presented above, I start by treating all
hotels affiliated with a brand as identical and then relax the assumption to account
for differences in sub-brand affiliation.31 Thus, for each brand j in market m in
period t, I count the number of unique name-address pairings affiliated with that
brand to determine the size of its portfolio, ωj,m,t. If brand j has not yet entered a
market, ωj,m,t = 0. Alterations to brands’ portfolios are defined as the net change
in the number of unique name-address pairings from one period to the next, i.e.
ωj,m,t − ωj,m,t−1.
Table 4.3 shows the total amount and frequency of changes to portfolio size for
entrants and incumbents, and indicates a modest amount of change in market struc-
ture over time. Assuming that each of the large brands has the option to change
its portfolio in any of the markets in any period, they chose to do so on average
30As discussed further below, I experimented with other ways of categorizing hotels with little
impact on the results.
31I maintain the assumption that hotels within a market are of identical size. This can be justified
by examining the average coefficient of variation of capacity in hotels across markets. I find that
the average is a modest 18.
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Table 4.2: Sub-Brands Affiliated with each Brand
Brand Sub-Brand Observations Average Rating
Clarion Inns & Suites 13 2.33
Comfort Inn 181 2.68
Comfort Suites 109 3.00
Choice Hotels Econo Lodge 151 2.05
Quality Inns & Suites 98 2.42
Rodeway Inn 21 2.00
Sleep Inn 22 2.00
Candlewood Suites 7 3.00
Crowne Plaza 1 3.00
Continent Hotels Holiday Inn 107 2.97
Holiday Inn Express 307 2.98
Staybridge Suites 2 3.00
Embassy Suites Hotels 10 3.00
Hampton Inn 172 3.00
Hilton Hotels Hilton 9 2.85
Hilton Garden Inn 2 3.00
Homewood Suites by Hilton 20 3.00
La Quinta La Quinta Inns 209 2.93
Courtyard 34 2.88
Fairfield Inn 81 2.81
Marriott International Residence Inn 31 3.00
Ritz-Carlton 3 3.00
Springhill Suites 3 3.00
Towneplace Suites 9 3.00
Baymont Inn & Suites 11 3.00
Days Inn Worldwide 370 2.19
Hawthorn Suites 3 3.00
Wyndham Johnson International 62 2.24
Ramada 151 2.24
Super 8 Motels 230 2.06
Travelodge Hotels 42 2.42
Wingate 8 3.00
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Table 4.3: Portfolio Changes





0 1,290 7,234 8,524
88.66 98.7 97.04
1 87 95 182
5.98 1.3 2.07
2 8 0 8
0.55 0 0.09
3 1 0 1
0.07 0 0.01
Total 1,455 7,329 8,784
100 100 100
Notes: The top row in a cell indicates the number of observations, while
the second indicates the percentage of that column’s observations.
only 3 percent of the time. This makes sense as demand conditions in hotel markets
evolve slowly, and there are substantial sunk costs involved. Of the 258 brand-period
observations in which a brand altered the size of its portfolio of hotels, only 10 of
the changes are greater than 1 in absolute value. For this reason, in the empirical
analysis, I topcode those that are greater than 1 to 1 and those that are less than -1
to -1.
There are 7,091 different market-period-taxpayer observations, indicating that
there are few instances of taxpayers owning more than one hotel in a given market.
Of these, 2,404 include at least one hotel affiliated with the six large brands. Of the
165 cases in which a taxpayer is associated with two or more hotels in a single market,





As elegantly argued in Eaton and Lipsey (1979), when spatial preemption is credi-
ble, the break-even point in time for introducing a new hotel for an incumbent occurs
prior to when it occurs for a potential entrant. Thus, if incumbents are engaging
in entry-deterrence, it can be detected by observing a higher likelihood of expansion
by incumbent brands rather than entry by brands with no hotels currently in the
market ceteris paribus. This is straightforwardly operationalized empirically by es-
timating and comparing the conditional choice probabilities of entry and expansion.
My baseline empirical approach is to estimate these things separately, using ordered
logit models to capture the decisions of incumbents and binary logit models for po-
tential entrants. As a robustness check, I estimate the two in tandem conditional on
at least one firm having decided to expand.32 In all cases, the dependent variable is
the change in the brand’s market portfolio size between time t and time t + 1, i.e.
Δωj,m,t+1, while the regressors are evaluated at time t.
Throughout the empirical analysis, I assume that each brand is a decision-maker
who can modify its portfolio in each market every period, and that a brand’s decision
to alter its portfolio in one market does not affect the likelihood of changes to any
other market. This assumes away the network externalities considered in recent work
(e.g. Jia (2008)), which is reasonable here given the substantial distance between
markets. Moreover, sub-sample analyses using markets even farther apart yielded
32Ideally, I would estimate a dynamic structural model of entry and exit by the different brands
(see Ackerberg et al. (2005) for a recent survey of these methods). This would maximize efficiency
by estimating entry and expansion decisions simultaneously. Unfortunately, several factors make a
structural approach infeasible. First, and most problematic, unobserved heterogeneity across mar-
kets is very important. This means that the state space would be too large to make structural
estimation feasible. Second, brands’ behavior appear to be non-stationary. In other words, adjust-
ment behavior seems to change non-monotonically over time. This would also inflate the size of
the state space to be considered. Third, I observe only a modest amount of variation in market
structures over time, which would increase the importance of parametric assumptions.
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similar results.33
The theoretical model in Section 2 highlights several factors that should affect the
different conditional choice probabilities. First, the likelihood of adding a new hotel
should be negatively related to the number of branded hotels already in the market
regardless of the brands they are affiliated with. However, the model implies effects
of different magnitudes depending on whether the hotels already in the market are
affiliated with the decision-maker or not. Therefore, if I am analyzing the behavior
of brand j, I proxy for the intensity of competition using the number of hotels be-




34 If an additional hotel affiliated with a different brand has
a smaller negative impact than an additional hotel in the brand’s own portfolio, this
is consistent with the presence of brand-effects which make intra-brand competition
more intense than inter-brand competition. It suggests that consumers are so heavily
affected by branding that it is more unprofitable to expand than to accept entry by
a competitor.
Second, the model suggests that firms with higher brand-values or more distinct
sub-brands should be better able to engage in preemption. I assess this possibility
through the inclusion of brand fixed effects in some specifications.35 In the follow-
ing section, however, I exploit the presence of revenue information in my data to
investigate the role of sub-brands in greater detail.
In order to control for heterogeneity across markets, I include each market’s pop-
33These results are available upon request.
34I experimented with more detailed market structure descriptions, but did not find that doing so
altered the results. In particular, I experimented with separating the total number of independents
into the number of high and low quality independents. The results were essentially unchanged. I
also experimented with other representations of the portfolios of competing brands, including the
number of hotels affiliated with the dominant competitor. Again, the results were qualitatively the
same. Details are available upon request.
35Examination of Brandweek suggests that abstracting from intertemporal variation in brand-
values is a reasonable assumption as the relative ranking of different hotel brands appears compara-
tively time-invariant. Moreover, recent research by Clark et al. (2009) suggests that advertising has
little effect (at least in the short term) on consumers’ quality impressions.
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ulation (in thousands) using U.S. Census data and the average household income
(in thousands) taken from the Statistics of Income (SOI) collected by the Internal
Revenue Service.36 I also include the number of “independent” hotels as a control.
Past research (e.g. Kalnins and Chung (2004)) has suggested that hotel segments are
sufficiently differentiated as to not compete with each other. Instead, there may be
inter-segment agglomeration economies. To control for changes in the macroeconomic
environment, I include year fixed effects in all regressions.
My baseline empirical models thus have the following form:





j,m,tλ + εj,m,t (4.5)
where Δω∗ is a latent utility variable indicating the desired modification to the current
portfolio of brand j in market m at time t, Xj,m,t is a vector of controls, and εj,m,t an
independent draw from an extreme value distribution. As Δω∗ increases, the firm will
choose higher ordered outcomes as it crosses unobservable (but estimable) cutpoints
(see Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for details).
The regressions will provide consistent estimates of how the variables capturing the
competitive structure of the market affect the likelihood of investment if the markets
are fundamentally equivalent after controlling for observable variation in population
and average household income. If the demographic controls do not fully capture the
profit potential in a given market, however, the coefficients on the market structure
variables could be biased. In particular, if some markets are inherently more profitable
- due to the presence of a tourist attraction or variation in local land use regulation
(see, e.g., Suzuki (2009)) - then it is likely that there will be more competitors in the
market and also that the decision-maker will be more likely to increase the size of her
36See: http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=120303,00.html. These data are only available
at the county level, so I use the value for the most common county for each city. As the SOI data
are only available through 2005, I linearly extrapolate the data for the remaining years.
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portfolio. I address this possibility through the use of fixed effects. Unlike random
effects, fixed effects may be correlated with the other variables, and thus can control
for time invariant unobserved differences in market profitability or costs. However, as
first described in Neyman and Scott (1948), the presence of incidental parameters, like
fixed effects, in non-linear models can produce biased results (as well as potentially
complicating estimation). The consequences for empiricists remain comparatively
unexplored. Some Monte Carlo studies suggest that as the length of the panel grows,
the problem disappears (e.g. Heckman (1981)) provided no dynamics are involved,
though Greene (2004) suggests that it is difficult to generalize. Insofar as I have
8 years of data for each market and more than one observation for most market-
periods, I believe that the probability of sizable bias is small.37 I test this assumption
by re-estimating the non-linear models using ordinary least squares (OLS). This is
not an ideal test insofar as the dependent variables in the entry/expansion models
are discrete while OLS assumes they are continuous. However, as fixed effects in
linear models are not subject to the problem of incidental parameters, comparing the
non-linear results with OLS results should show whether the logit and ordered logit
fixed effects models are generally accurate.
As my regressors are functions of previous values of the dependent variable, the
presence of market fixed effects also may reasonably lead to concerns about corre-
lations in the error terms as in dynamic panel estimation (see, e.g., Cameron and
Trivedi (2005, chap. 22.5)). I believe the problems are unlikely to be pronounced
here as my righthand-side variables are not simple lags of the dependent variable.
Moreover, I am including market fixed effects rather than brand-market fixed effects.
Nevertheless, as a robustness check, I estimate a linear instrumental variables model
using one-period lagged values of the potentially endogenous market structure vari-
ables (i.e. the decision-maker’s portfolio and the number of branded competitors) as
37This assumption is supported by recent work by Collard-Wexler (2009), who finds evidence of
only small bias in a pure panel with 12 observations per group.
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instruments.
As another form of robustness check, in some models, I include a measure indi-
cating the relative dominance of the brand. This term helps control for the greater
complexity of markets in the data relative to the theoretical model. In addition, as
formalized in Ellison and Ellison (2007), it is reasonable to expect a non-monotonic
relationship between preemptive behavior and the threat of entry by incumbents.38
To a large extent, I believe the market-specific fixed effects should capture the level
of the threat of entry. Nevertheless, as another robustness check, in some regressions
I include time varying controls for the threat of entry. Specifically, I use a quadratic
function of the difference in size between the largest and smallest portfolios in the
market in some regressions. The theoretical model suggests that entry should be
most likely when there is a large gap between the incumbents’ portfolio size and the
potential entrant, so I use this gap as a proxy for the threat of entry.
In all regressions, I employ standard errors clustered at the market level. Clus-
tering at this level allows me to account for the possibility that the decision-makers’
choices in markets may be correlated across brands and periods. This reduces the
number of degrees of freedom, making it more difficult to find statistically significant
results, and hence is a conservative approach.
4.4.2 Empirical Analysis
Table 4.4 shows summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis of changes
in brands’ portfolios. Consistent with the theoretical model’s implication that incum-
bents should not be able to deter entry, Table 4.5 shows that the vast majority of
brands have no more than one hotel in a market. For example, the Table indicates
that of the 558 brand-market-observations in markets with two branded hotels, only
38This is because if the threat of entry is very low, it is unlikely that the incumbent will wish to
incur the cost of deterrence. Similarly, when the probability of entry is very high, then it is unlikely
that deterrence will work, making it unappealing. Only when the threat of entry is modest should
deterrence be an attractive strategy.
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Hotels in the portfolio 9,882 0.25 0.68 0.00 8.00
- Choice 1,647 0.36 0.83 0.00 6.00
- Continent 1,647 0.26 0.51 0.00 3.00
- Hilton 1,647 0.13 0.44 0.00 4.00
- La Quinta 1,647 0.13 0.38 0.00 3.00
- Marriott 1,647 0.10 0.48 0.00 4.00
- Wyndham 1,647 0.53 1.05 0.00 8.00
Other Brand Networks’ hotels 9,882 1.25 2.66 0.00 23.00
Independent hotels 9,882 2.92 3.88 0.00 28.00
Population (’000s) 9,882 14.28 29.85 0.96 223.18
Income (’000s) 9,882 41.39 9.41 18.57 93.61
Share of Branded Portfolios 1,675 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.71
Changes to Portfolios 8,784 0.01 0.18 -2.00 3.00
Total Number of Branded hotels 9,882 1.51 3.15 0.00 25.00
Entry Threat 9,882 0.69 1.10 0.00 8.00
14 (i.e. 2.5 percent) are for brands controlling all of the branded hotels in the market.
4.4.2.1 Expansion by Incumbents
Table 4.6 reveals how incumbent brands (i.e. those with at least one affiliated hotel
in a market) change their portfolios as a function of their own current portfolio size,
the number of hotels affiliated with the other five brands, the number of independents,
and local demographic conditions. In this case, the left-hand side of (4.5) for each
decision-maker is -1, 0, or 1. Table 4.7 indicates the average effect of a marginal
change in the different independent variables on the probabilities of the different
outcomes for the non-linear regressions.39
Column 1 shows the results of my baseline estimation of incumbents’ decision-
making. cut1 and cut2 represent the two threshold parameters between the different
ordered outcomes. A joint test that all of the market effects are equal to 0 is rejected
39I follow Cameron and Trivedi (2005) in presenting average effects of a small change rather than
marginal effects calculated at the mean of the explanatory variables.
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Table 4.5: Market Structure and Market Size
Portfolio Size
Total Branded 0 1 2 3 Total
2 386 158 14 0 558
69.18 28.32 2.51 0 100
3 232 157 25 0 414
56.04 37.92 6.04 0 100
4 178 134 52 2 366
48.63 36.61 14.21 0.55 100
5 147 162 54 15 378
38.89 42.86 14.29 3.97 100
6 34 76 22 6 138
24.64 55.07 15.94 4.35 100
7 35 83 26 18 162
21.6 51.23 16.05 11.11 100
Notes: The table shows the relationship between the total
number of hotels affiliated with the large national brands
and the size of individual brands’ portfolios. The top row in
a cell indicates the number of observations, while the second
indicates the percentage of that row’s observations.
at the 1 percent level.40 Table 4.7 indicates that one additional unit in the brand’s
own portfolio is associated with an almost 6 percent decrease in the likelihood of
expanding. By contrast, an additional branded competitor translates to a reduced
likelihood of expansion of just 3.3 percent. The difference between the two coeffi-
cients is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and is inconsistent with large
incumbents preempting smaller ones. Overall, the results indicate that larger players
are less likely to expand than their smaller competitors, which is consistent with the
theoretical model’s prediction that when branding plays a large role in consumers’
decision-making, market share will be evenly distributed.
The finding that large incumbents are less likely to open new hotels than smaller
ones is robust across specifications. In column 2, I control more explicitly for brands’
share of the market, and find a negative, albeit statistically insignificant, relationship
40This is also true for all subsequent regressions involving market effects.
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Table 4.6: Alterations to Incumbent Brand Network’s Portfolios
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hotels in the Portfolio -1.052*** -1.047*** -0.939*** -1.375***
0.227 0.23 0.235 0.296
Other Branded Hotels -0.599*** -0.602*** -0.500*** -0.473***
0.16 0.173 0.171 0.179
Independent Hotels 0.124 0.125 0.004 0.042
0.115 0.118 0.126 0.136
Population (’000s) 0.168*** 0.169*** 0.189*** 0.202***
0.058 0.061 0.062 0.064
Income (’000s) -0.008 -0.008 0.014 0.021
0.049 0.049 0.058 0.06
Share of Branded -0.074 0.021 -1.101
1.08 1.061 1.211
Entry Threat -1.180* -1.102*
0.643 0.638












cut1 9.628* 9.692 9.324 9.923
5.6 5.922 5.884 6.035
cut2 16.129*** 16.192*** 15.871*** 16.781***
5.743 6.061 6.033 6.204
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1455 1455 1455 1455
Number of Markets 87 87 87 87
Log Likelihood -553.916 -553.913 -550.839 -528.329
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the market level are below coeffi-
cients.
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between market share and the likelihood of expansion.41 Column 3 adds time-varying
controls for the threat of entry. The results indicate that controlling more explicitly
for the threat of entry does not change the result that brands are not engaging in
entry deterrence. Instead, they further emphasize concerns about cannibalization
as the negative and significant coefficient on the linear term is consistent with the
inability of incumbents to deter entry or expansion by smaller competitors.
In column 4, I control for the possibility that the results are driven by hetero-
geneity in the different brands by including dummy variables for each brand. A test
that these dummy variables are jointly indistinguishable from 0 is rejected at the 1
percent level of statistical significance, indicating that there are significant behavioral
differences across the brands. After controlling for this heterogeneity, the estimated
difference between the impact of hotels affiliated with the decision-maker and all oth-
ers actually increases. Moreover, the coefficients on the different brand fixed effects
appear intuitive. They indicate that Choice (the excluded category) and Wynd-
ham are most likely to expand. As can be seen in Table 4.2, these firms’ affiliated
brands are quite dispersed in name and frequency. This dispersion may decrease the
cannibalization problem caused by adding an additional hotel. Thus, an increased
likelihood of expansion would be expected. Marriott also has a number of prominent
sub-brands with distinctly different names, but is much less likely to expand. This
may be reconciled by noting that the Marriott logo tends to feature prominently in
the signage of all affiliated brands, and the brand has a very well-established loy-
alty program. Both factors could lead to more intense brand-valuations that would
increase cannibalization effects, leading to lower expansion rates.
The findings on the control variables are broadly intuitive and consistent across
specifications. In line with the cross-segment agglomeration effects found in Kalnins
41In subsample analyses, I also found results consistent with the idea that incumbency or monopoly
control over a market does not confer the ability to defend market power. The result of these models
are available upon request.
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Table 4.7: Estimated Mean Marginal Effects in Independent Variables
Change in Portfolio Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Hotels in the Portfolio 0.045 0.045 0.040 0.057
Other Branded Hotels 0.025 0.026 0.021 0.019
Independent Hotels -0.005 -0.005 0.000 -0.002
-1 Population (’000s) -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008
Income (’000s) 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
Share of Branded 0.003 -0.001 0.046
Entry Threat 0.050 0.046
(Entry Threat)2 -0.005 -0.004
Hotels in the Portfolio 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.018
Other Branded Hotels 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.006
Independent Hotels -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001
0 Population (’000s) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
Income (’000s) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Share of Branded 0.001 0.000 0.014
Entry Threat 0.017 0.014
(Entry Threat)2 -0.002 -0.001
Hotels in the Portfolio -0.059 -0.059 -0.053 -0.075
Other Branded Hotels -0.033 -0.033 -0.028 -0.025
Independent Hotels 0.007 0.007 0.000 0.002
1 Population (’000s) 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.012
Income (’000s) -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
Share of Branded -0.004 0.001 -0.060
Entry Threat -0.067 -0.060
(Entry Threat)2 0.006 0.006
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and Chung (2004), the number of independent hotels is positively correlated (albeit
statistically insignificantly and of small economic magnitude) with the likelihood of
expansion. Population has a positive and significant effect, indicating that growing
markets are more likely to see expansion by incumbent brands. Household income,
however, is economically and statistically insignificant.
Table 4.8 shows the results of robustness checks. Column 1 indicates what happens
when the market fixed effects are omitted from the ordered logit models. The results
indicate a smaller, but still negative and significant effect, for the number of hotels in
the brand’s portfolio, and a positive, albeit statistically and economically insignificant,
correlation between the likelihood that an additional hotel is opened in the next period
and the number of branded competitors. Both differences from my baseline results
are consistent with the presence of unobserved profitability differences that lead to
higher levels of concentration in some markets, indicating that the market controls
are necessary. Column 2 estimates the OLS analogue to Column 4 of Table 4.6.
The coefficients are all consistent in sign and comparative magnitudes to those of
the non-linear models’ marginal effects. The marginal effects of the market structure
variables, however, are about twice as large in the OLS models as in the ordered
logit regressions.42 The results of the regression that uses lagged values of the market
structure variables as instruments for the current market structure are presented in
Column 3. They are extremely similar though they yield less precise estimates.43
42Given the very different assumptions underpinning the different models, I do not find this
difference particularly concerning. However, in future work, I plan to explore whether it is consistent
with the presence of incidental parameters bias as in Greene (2004).
43My results are also robust to re-parameterizations where market structure is controlled for using
shares of all hotels in the market, sub-sample analysis of just small markets (as proxied by the number
of hotels there), including a dummy indicating that the decision-maker is a monopolist, and using
more isolated markets (i.e. where the markets are at least 20 miles apart as previously defined).
Results for these models are available upon request.
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Table 4.8: Incumbent Expansion Robustness Results
(1) (2) (3)
Hotels in the Portfolio -0.363*** -0.137*** -0.137*
0.111 0.028 0.072
Other Branded Hotels 0.013 -0.053** -0.074
0.019 0.02 0.067
Independent Hotels 0.024 0.005 -0.001
0.042 0.015 0.019
Population (’000s) 0.008 0.020*** 0.023*
0.005 0.007 0.014
Income (’000s) 0.009 0.002 0.002
0.01 0.006 0.007
Share of Branded -0.138 -0.267
0.117 0.202
Entry Threat -0.107 -0.124
0.079 0.108


















Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Market Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Observations 1455 1455 1298
Number of Markets 87 87 87
Log Likelihood -593.718 -378.837
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01




Table 4.9 presents the results, and Table 4.10 shows associated mean marginal
effects, for empirical analyses of potential entrants’ decisions. As noted above, po-
tential entrants are defined as brands that do not yet have an affiliated hotel in the
market. Thus, the left-hand side of (4.5) for each decision-maker is just 0 or 1.
Table 4.9: Models of Potential Entrants’ Decisions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Other branded hotels -1.828*** -2.104*** -1.916*** -0.058***
0.384 0.575 0.636 0.015
Independent hotels 0.024 -0.247 -0.181 -0.002
0.235 0.262 0.293 0.005
Population (’000s) 0.772*** 0.610* 0.525* 0.025***
0.266 0.338 0.312 0.005
Income (’000s) 0.084 0.073 0.087 0.001
0.16 0.102 0.093 0.001
Entry Threat -3.656*** -3.936*** -0.016
1.031 1.141 0.02












Constant -70.726** 3.69E+07 -1.54E+07 -1.894***
28.097 6.62E+07 6.62E+07 0.539
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2064 2064 2064 7329
Number of Markets 65 65 65 180
Log Likelihood -312.827 -316.372 -275.912 6034.409
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the market level are below coeffi-
cients.
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Column 1 of Table 4.9 shows the results of a logit model with market fixed effects.
The results imply, as expected, that more intense competition is correlated with a
lower likelihood of entry.44 A large number of observations are lost due to the fact
that in some markets the entry decision is perfectly determined by the market fixed
effect. The results for the other variables are also all broadly consistent in sign,
significance, and rough magnitude with those found in Table 4.6. Column 2 shows
that these results are robust to controlling for the threat of entry.45 Column 3 includes
brand-specific dummy variables; again, the results are broadly consistent with what
was previously observed. Column 4 estimates the same specification using OLS; the
qualitative findings in the previous columns are robust to the inclusion of the dropped
markets. However, as in the regressions of incumbent brands’ decisions, the marginal
effects are slightly different between the logit and OLS models. In this case, the
OLS coefficient is slightly smaller for the number of competitors already present.
Interestingly, while the coefficients are quite similar in the OLS models of entry and
expansion, the marginal effects of the logit and ordered logit models are moderately
different for the effect of the number of other competitors. Overall, I think the broad
similarity of the magnitudes of the estimates in the expansion and entry models is an
indication of the robustness of the approach.
4.4.2.3 Comparing Entry to Expansion
Insight into how market structure affects the likelihood of expansion versus entry
can be gained by looking at the marginal effects of changes in the market structure
on the likelihood of expansion versus entry holding all factors constant, including the
44As before, omitting market effects leads to a spuriously positive correlation between competition
and entry. These results are available upon request.
45These results also control for the fact that a negative sign on the number of other branded hotels
in the market could be consistent with preemption insofar as it might indicate that an entrant would
not enter a market where a single incumbent had a large presence. I am grateful to Uday Rajan for
pointing out this possibility.
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Table 4.10: Estimated Mean Marginal Effects of Marginal Change in Independent
Variables
(1) (2) (3)
Other branded hotels -0.071 -0.079 -0.065
Independent hotels 0.001 -0.009 -0.006
Population (’000s) 0.029 0.022 0.017
Income (’000s) 0.003 0.003 0.003
Entry Threat -0.138 -0.133
(Entry Threat)2 0.045 0.039
unobserved market heterogeneity.46 I provide one example of this approach in Figure
4.4, which shows the relative likelihood of expansion versus entry as a function of
market structure. The X-axis indicates the number of branded hotels in the market.
For the incumbent, I assume these are all affiliated with its brand. For the entrant,
they are all competitors. The other variables are arbitrarily set at the level for the
market of Nacogdoches in 2002. The predictions are based on estimation (1) of Table
4.6 and estimation (1) of Table 4.9.47 Consistent with the simple description above,
the Figure shows that the likelihood of expansion is substantially lower than the
likelihood of entry for all values of the number of hotels in the market.48
Obviously, this is simply one market, which makes generalization difficult. A
less arbitrary and more comprehensive way to test for preemption that explicitly
accounts for differences in the mean likelihoods is to compare the predicted likelihood
of expansion by incumbents to the predicted likelihood of entry by potential entrants
holding market structure constant. For the 392 market-periods where some but not
all brands are present, meaning that both entry and expansion are possible, the mean
likelihood of expansion is 4.54 percent (using estimation (1) of Table 4.6), while the
46One cannot simply focus on the estimated mean marginal effects due to the fact that the models
have different baseline likelihoods since the market fixed effects are not the same.
47In 2002, Nacogdoches had 6 independents, a population slightly in excess of 30,000, and an
average household income of $40,700. It supported a total of six branded hotels.
48While Figure 4.4 is generally indicative of the data, it is worth noting that there are some
markets where differences in the values of the market-effects are such that the probability of entry
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Figure 4.4: Likelihood of entry versus expansion in Nacogdoches
mean likelihood of entry is 6.84 percent (using estimation (1) of Table 4.9). Thus, the
likelihood of entry is over 2 percentage points higher (i.e. almost 51 percent higher),
and the difference between the two series is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level.49
To further probe the relative likelihood of entry versus I estimate binary logits
(and a linear probability model) of the decision to add a hotel conditional on the fact
that at least one property is added to the market between periods.50 This approach
has the benefit of constraining the different control variables to symmetrically impact
entrants and incumbents, and reduces the likelihood that the need to separately
estimate coefficients that should be identical will lead to noisy estimates. However, it
49There are 392 observations, and the standard errors for the propensity to expand and enter are
0.044 and 0.099, respectively.
50Specifically, I focus on those markets where at least one new branded hotel was added to the
market, and no incumbent chose to reduce its portfolio. This limitation was implemented to make
it as reasonable as possible to reduce the left-hand side to a binary choice for both entrants and
incumbents. There were 25 market-years where two or three new hotels opened.
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Table 4.11: Models of Conditional Addition Decisions
(1) (2) (3)
Entrant Dummy 0.613* 1.064** 0.163**
0.353 0.433 0.062
Hotels in the Portfolio -0.023 -0.306 -0.043
0.192 0.227 0.041
Other branded hotels -0.111 -0.054 -0.008
0.124 0.143 0.025
Independent hotels -0.064 -0.082 -0.013
0.087 0.094 0.017
Population (’000s) -0.032 -0.048 -0.007
0.037 0.042 0.007












Constant 3.713 6.426* 1.373**
3.312 3.783 0.622
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Market Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 762 762 762
Number of Markets 72 72 72
Log Likelihood -376.632 -340.001 -344.343
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the market level are be-
low coefficients.
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has the drawback of dramatically reducing the sample to just those market-periods
where either entry or expansion took place. Thus, there is less data with which to
identify the effects.
Table 4.11 shows the results of these regressions, while Table 4.12 shows the mean
marginal impact of changes in the independent variables. Consistent with what I
found using the predicted likelihoods, the models indicate that entrants are much
more likely to account for the new hotels in these markets. An entrant is 10-20
percent more likely to increase its portfolio than an incumbent with one property,
depending on the specification. When brand fixed effects are employed, I find, as
before and consistent with the theoretical model, that large incumbents are least
likely to expand. The difference between the coefficients on the number of hotels in a
firm’s portfolio and its competitors’ is statistically significant. Appealingly, the same
general patterns in the firm fixed effects recur. As before, Wyndham and Choice are
much more likely to account for the new hotels. Marriott, which has a particularly
developed loyalty program and aggressive branding, and La Quinta, which only has
one sub-brand, are the least likely.
In all of the regressions, none of the control variables are statistically or econom-
ically significant. This is not surprising given that I am already conditioning on the
fact that entry and/or expansion will take place.
Overall, the data support the theoretical model’s prediction that in an industry –
like lodging – where branding is a key driver of consumers’ choices, it will be difficult
to sustain spatial preemption, as entry is more likely than expansion.
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Table 4.12: Estimated Mean Marginal Effects of Marginal Change in Independent
Variables
(1) (2)
Entrant Dummy* 0.096 0.150
Hotels in the Portfolio -0.004 -0.044
Other branded hotels -0.018 -0.008
Independent hotels -0.010 -0.012
Population (’000s) -0.005 -0.007
Income (’000s) 0.002 0.002
* Effect of Entrant Dummy calculated by taking the mean
of the differences between predicted likelihoods when the
dummy is equal to 1 and when it is set equal to 0.
4.5 Extensions
4.5.1 Hotel Revenue Regressions
The theoretical model presented above predicts that brands do not engage in spa-
tial preemption because the prominence of branding means that the cannibalization
effect dominates tougher competition with unaffiliated hotels. This can be tested
empirically by regressing individual hotels’ revenues on the same market structure
variables as in the previous section. Holding demand conditions constant, a hotel’s
revenue should fall with the number of both affiliated and competing hotels. How-
ever, the presence of an affiliated hotel should have a larger negative effect if the
cannibalization effect is pronounced. Thus, my baseline estimating equation in this
section has the following form:






where Rk,j,m,t indicates the revenues of specific hotel k affiliated with brand j in
market m at time t. As before, X represents a vector of brand, market, and time
controls.
I extend this empirical approach to test hypotheses about competition within
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brands. As noted above, the cannibalization effect should be reduced if two hotels
affiliated with the same brand belong to separate sub-brands. I test this by disag-
gregating the portfolio associated with a brand into the number of hotels affiliated
with the hotel’s own sub-brand and the number affiliated with all other sub-brands of
the brand. If the sub-brand effect is important, then the magnitude of the coefficient
on the number of hotels affiliated with the hotel’s own sub-brand should be largest,
followed by the coefficient on other hotels affiliated with the same brand, followed by
that associated with the number of competing hotels.51
I further leverage the revenue data to test Hadfield (1991)’s prediction that un-
der certain conditions incumbents can more successfully engage in entry deterrence
by delegating decision-making to highly-incentivized local agents (i.e. franchising).
Hadfield (1991) shows that the strategy can succeed because the costs imposed by
having to compete with the entrant, while felt in full by a vertically integrated brand,
are distributed across the different owners under franchising. Meanwhile, the cost of
exiting the market are felt only by each owner. Thus, a spatial preemption strat-
egy will be more credible. I test this hypothesis by looking at the impact on hotel
revenues of the extent of vertical separation by its brand-parent in that market. If
franchising is associated with successful preemption, we would expect higher (or at
least not lower) revenues in markets where ownership is more dispersed.52 To control
for the extent of franchising, I use the ratio of the number of hotels to the number of
residual claimants in a brand’s portfolio to the fixed effect ordered logit model. This
ratio will be higher when the brands’ hotels are owned by different parties. Thus, if
franchising facilitates spatial preemption, one would expect a non-positive coefficient,
because, at worst, more unified ownership should not increase revenues. Otherwise,
franchising would not facilitate preemption.
51I cannot test the effect of sub-brand differentiation in the dynamic analysis, because there are
not enough data to incorporate the choice of sub-brand after deciding to open a new hotel.
52As with the impact of sub-brand differentiation, the data do not permit controlling for franchising
in the dynamic analysis.
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Table 4.13: Summary Statistics for Revenue Regressions
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log Revenues (’000s) 2479 5.59 0.74 0.98 7.84
Revenues (’000s) 2479 341.59 251.98 2.66 2528.25
Hotels in the Portfolio 2479 1.08 1.47 0.00 7.00
- Same Sub-brand 2479 0.11 0.35 0.00 2.00
- Different Sub-brands 2479 0.97 1.33 0.00 7.00
Other Branded Hotels 2479 13.82 24.71 -1.00 104.00
Independent Hotels 2479 9.72 8.10 0.00 28.00
Population (’000s) 2479 67.99 70.53 1.22 223.18
Income (’000s) 2479 44.62 9.21 22.26 93.61
Hotels : Owners 2479 1.04 0.16 1.00 2.00
Table 4.13 shows the summary statistics for the variables used in the revenue
regressions, while Table 4.14 shows the results of OLS regressions of the natural log of
hotel revenues (in thousands) on different combinations of market structure variables
using a variety of brand and sub-brand fixed effects. As before, in all regressions, I
cluster the standard errors at the market level, and employ market and year fixed
effects as well as demographic controls.
Overall, the data strongly support the theoretical model. Column 1 includes
brand fixed effects, and shows that the presence of a brand-affiliated hotel has an
approximately 17.5 times larger negative effect on hotel revenues than a hotel affiliated
with a competing brand.53 In Column 2, I test the sub-brand proliferation prediction,
which says that the effect of affiliated hotels with different sub-brands should have
smaller negative effects than hotels of the same sub-brand, and find that the data
support it. As predicted, the estimated coefficients show that hotel revenues are most
negatively affected by the presence of hotels that share both brand and sub-brand
effects with it. Sharing just the brand-effect reduces the magnitude by half; being
affiliated with another competitor has only one thirtieth the impact. However, the
difference between the coefficient on the number of hotels in the same sub-brand
53This finding is echoed in other papers in this literature (e.g. Suzuki (2009)).
110
and the coefficient for the number of all others affiliated with the hotel’s brand is
not statistically significant. This lack of significance is not surprising given that I
only observe a few instances where more than one of a given sub-brand are present
in a market in a given period. In Column 3, I replace the brand fixed effects with
sub-brand fixed effects, which more fully account for variation within networks. The
resulting estimates are again as predicted, though the coefficient on the number of
identically sub-branded hotels is no longer statistically significant at conventional
levels. Again, I do not find this problematic, given the large number of sub-brand
effects that must be estimated.
In Column 4, I test the prediction of Hadfield (1991) that vertical separation can
facilitate spatial preemption. Contrary to the prediction, I find that the coefficient
on the ratio variable is positive (though a one-tailed test that the coefficient is non-
negative is just outside of conventional levels of significance). This result can be
rationalized by recognizing that the model in Hadfield (1991) relies on the assump-
tion that the franchisees price at the same level as a vertically integrated firm. If
franchisees compete against each other, however, then profits at separately owned
hotels will be lower than if the same franchisee owned them both. Hadfield (1991)
states that the incumbent can keep their local agents from competing against each
other through the use of resale price maintenance. My results suggest that hotel fran-
chisors cannot compel their franchisees to cooperate, which is consistent with what
other studies have found for other industries (see, e.g., Thomadsen (2005)).54
Overall, these results for the impact of market structure on hotels’ revenues are
consistent with those in the previous section, and are in line with the model of spatial
competition suggested by the theoretical model above. They suggest that hotels
affiliated with one brand are close substitutes for each other but poor substitutes for
54If franchisors were able to enforce cooperative pricing, it is likely that the issue of encroachment
- when a franchisor opens a second franchise in a market - would be less contentious (see, e.g., Blair
and Lafontaine (2005)).
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Table 4.14: Hotel Revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Same Sub-brand -0.127* -0.106 -0.133*
0.066 0.07 0.075




Other Branded Hotels -0.004** -0.004** -0.005*** -0.005***
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Independent Hotels -0.01 -0.008 -0.011 -0.008
0.014 0.014 0.012 0.013
Population (’000s) -0.006 -0.006 -0.008 -0.007
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008
Income (’000s) 0.016** 0.016** 0.015* 0.015*
0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008
Ratio of Hotels to Owners 0.227
0.182
Constant 5.679*** 5.640*** 6.194*** 5.837***
0.775 0.776 0.892 0.983
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sub-brand Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
Brand Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No
Observations 2479 2479 2479 2479
R-squared 0.58 0.58 0.66 0.66
Number of Markets 90 90 90 90
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the market level are below coeffi-
cients.
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competing brands, making it unprofitable to engage in spatial preemption.
4.5.2 Hotel Owner Portfolios
Because lodging franchisees are not contractually inhibited from working with
multiple franchisors, I extend the analysis by examining the behavior of hotel owners.
Ideally, I would re-estimate the same types of regressions as in Section 4. Unfortu-
nately, due to rapid turnover in the unique taxpayer identification numbers, there are
not enough observations to make such an approach possible. Instead, I present Table
4.15, which shows how changes in the number of branded hotels owned by a taxpayer
in a given market relate to the number of brands that taxpayer affiliates with in the
market. I condition on the fact that the taxpayer already owns at least one branded
hotel in the market. There are only a small number of meaningful observations, be-
cause there are few changes in market structure, and most taxpayers never have more
than one branded hotel in any given market. However, the Table is consistent with
what the model predicts: that owners of multiple hotels spread their holdings across
networks. For example, all three observations of a local owner choosing to add a new
branded hotel to its portfolio in a given market are associated with a partnership
with a new franchisor.
Table 4.15: Local Hotel Owner Portfolio Changes
Δ Networks
-2 -1 0 1 Total
-2 1 0 0 0 1
-1 0 7 2 0 9
0 0 0 1,779 0 1,779
1 0 0 0 3 3
Total 1 7 1,781 3 1,792
Notes: The Table shows the relationship between
the change in the number of brands a given hotel-
owner is affiliated with and the number of branded
hotels that they own.
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I draw further support for the theoretical model’s prediction that local hotel own-
ers should be more likely to engage in preemption from other papers considering
market power in lodging markets. Using a different period of the CPS data, Conlin
and Kadiyali (2006) examine slack capacity as a function of market structure. They
find that local owners with large market shares are more likely to have large amounts
of slack capacity, which they interpret as evidence in support of entry deterrence.
The slack capacity result would be consistent with earlier introduction of new hotels
by the incumbents, as predicted by my model.
4.6 Conclusion
The canonical models of spatial preemption suggest that incumbents in differen-
tiated product markets should be able to defend their market power by strategically
introducing new offerings into the product space. However, this result has been hard
to document in much of the empirical literature. Incorporating insights from the
growing structural literature on differentiated product demand into a version of the
typical entry-deterrence game, I show that the presence of strong brand preferences
inhibits multi-product firms’ ability to engage in entry deterrence. This occurs be-
cause consumer preferences for specific brands makes intra-firm competition more
intense than inter-firm competition, reducing the benefits to preemptive expansion.
The model also suggests that in industries where products themselves have strong
identities, or fall into different product segments, spatial preemption can more easily
be sustained.
I test predictions of the theoretical model using data on hotel operations in Texas
from 2000 through 2008. First, consistent with the stylized fact that consumers of
lodging are highly affected by branding, I find that the large hotel brands are not en-
gaging in spatial preemption. To the contrary, the data show that incumbent brands
on average accommodate expansion by smaller incumbents as well as true entry. In
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markets where both entry and expansion by incumbents are possible, I find that, on
average, entry is 50 percent more likely. Second, I exploit the presence of revenue
information in the Texas data to see if these decisions are consistent with brand affil-
iation leading to large cannibalization effects. As predicted, the data show a negative
monotonic relationship between a hotel’s revenues and other hotels’ proximity in the
product space. Hotels in the same sub-brand have negative effects 1.5 - 2 times larger
than hotels from other sub-brands but part of the same brand, which have approxi-
mately 10 - 15 times larger negative effects than other competitors. Third, examining
the portfolios of local hotel-owners, I find support for the theoretical model’s predic-
tions insofar as the data show that when these parties add a new hotel to a local
portfolio, they almost always associate it with a new brand.
Overall, the paper’s insight into the interplay between demand linkages and entry-
deterrence helps to explain why the evidence of entry deterrence is so heterogeneous.
For example, it is intuitive that Berry and Waldfogel (2001) observe spatial preemp-
tion in radio markets, because stations betray no evidence that they share a common
corporate brand. On the other hand, substantial brand effects could explain the
lack of preemption that Burton (1994) finds for the insecticide industry. Similarly,
research on spatial competition in fast food markets, another industry where con-
sumers’ behavior indicates brand loyalty, shows that competition is fiercer between
outlets sharing a brand affiliation (e.g. Thomadsen (2005)). My hope is that future
work will shed further light on the role branding plays in entry deterrence by exploit-
ing inter-industry and intertemporal variation in the strength of brand preferences.
In addition, I believe exploring the reasons for endogenous variation (see, e.g., Sutton
(2007)) in the extent to which firms pursue strong brand identities (i.e. the difference
between Marriott and Choice) will prove fruitful.
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Appendix
In this section, I provide the results of numerical solutions to the theoretical model.
In these simulations, I assume that the μ are all drawn from normal distributions
with mean 0 and variance σ. I show the relationship between heterogeneous brand
preferences and cannibalization by varying the parameters affecting the variance of
consumers’ heterogeneous brand preferences (σ) and the baseline benefit to staying
in one of the hotels in the market (δ). Code for the simulations is written in Matlab
7.8 by the author and is available upon request.
Table 4.16 shows the prices, revenues, and market shares for one hotel under
different market structures for different parameter values. The first column of the
Table indicates the behavior and payoffs for one hotel in a 2-hotel market where both
hotels are affiliated with a single brand. Column two indicates the results for one
hotel in a duopolistic market. Column 3 shows the results for one hotel affiliated
with a 2-hotel incumbent in 3-hotel markets. Column 4 indicates the results for the
entrant in such markets.
As described in the text above, the results show that as the magnitude of σ grows
relative to δ, the returns to adding an additional hotel fall for brands. For example,
when δ is fixed at 3, the tables show that as σ increases from 0 to 4, the difference
between RI(2, 1) and RI(1, 1) falls from 0.28 to 0.19.
Analogous results for markets with the local-owners as decision-makers are avail-
able upon request.
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Table 4.16: Numerical Results of Theoretical Model for One Hotel Under Different
Market Structures
2 Hotels 3 Hotels
Monopoly Competition Incumbent Entrant
Price 3.00 1.77 2.04 1.63
σ = 0 & δ = 3 Revenue 1.00 0.77 0.52 0.63
Mkt Share 0.33 0.44 0.26 0.39
Price 3.26 2.16 2.44 2.05
σ = 1 & δ = 3 Revenue 0.94 0.86 0.56 0.75
Mkt Share 0.29 0.40 0.23 0.37
Price 3.93 2.87 3.13 2.78
σ = 2 & δ = 3 Revenue 0.93 0.98 0.61 0.90
Mkt Share 0.24 0.34 0.19 0.33
Price 4.81 3.68 3.92 3.60
σ = 3 & δ = 3 Revenue 0.97 1.12 0.67 1.05
Mkt Share 0.20 0.30 0.17 0.29
Price 5.75 4.53 4.76 4.45
σ = 4 & δ = 3 Revenue 1.05 1.27 0.73 1.22
Mkt Share 0.18 0.28 0.15 0.27
Price 6.73 5.37 5.60 5.33
σ = 5 & δ = 3 Revenue 1.14 1.42 0.80 1.38
Mkt Share 0.17 0.26 0.14 0.26
Price 7.75 6.32 6.54 6.23
σ = 6 & δ = 3 Revenue 1.24 1.60 0.89 1.54
Mkt Share 0.16 0.25 0.14 0.25
Price 2.73 1.95 2.19 1.86
σ = 1 & δ = 2 Revenue 0.67 0.66 0.45 0.58
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